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Introduction
The law of multiple state responsibility is undeveloped. The scholarly
literature is surprisingly devoid of reference to the circumstances or con-
sequences of multiple state responsibility.' Judicial or arbitral decisions
addressing a state's assertions that other states share responsibility are
essentially unknown. Given this lack of attention to multiple state re-
sponsibility, it is not surprising that the issue of reparation in such cir-
cumstances has received even less attention. Yet, a mature system of
international law must comprehend the responsibility of multiple state
actors for a single event-including the responsible states' duties of
reparation.
* The authors thank Mark Janis and Howard Berman for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts. This Article is an expanded and modified treatment of a subject introduced in B.
SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT: THE RULES OF
DECISION (1988).
t Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. J.D., University of Virginia, 1977.
t: Partner, Pettit and Martin, San Francisco, CA. J.D., University of Virginia, 1977;
Ph.D., Trinity College, Cambridge University, 1986.
I. See 2 F. GARCfA-AMADOR, THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 765-
840 (1984) (reprinting numerous efforts to codify principles of state responsibility by the
League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International
Law, the Hague Codification Conference, the International Law Commission, Inter-American
and other regional groups, and private institutions, none of which address multiple state re-
sponsibility). But see I. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSI-
BILITY (Part I) 189-92 (1983).
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State practice presents a host of fact situations that make consideration
of multiple state responsibility appropriate and inevitable. When two or
more states join together to attack a third state or collaborate to launch a
space vehicle that crashes and causes injury in a third state, for example,
an essential issue arises: If both acting states are responsible in interna-
tional law, what is the reparation obligation of each to the victim state?
If a compensation obligation arises, should joint and several liability ap-
ply-with either state obligated to pay full compensation to the injured
state-or should each state be liable only in part? The same questions
may be posed with respect to the violation of any international norm.
The participation of more than one state in, for example, failure to honor
multilateral treaty obligations, a violation of the territorial sovereignty of
another state, damage to the territory or property of another state by
polluting activities, injury to diplomats of another state, or mistreatment
of nationals of another state all raise issues of multiple state
responsibility.
This article categorizes the situations in which multiple state responsi-
bility may arise, discusses the procedural and political impediments ex-
plaining why this issue has not been more prevalent in the international
arena, and then surveys the various possible consequences of a -breach of
an international law duty. Although the position of international law on
the subject of compensation in a multiple responsibility context is "indis-
tinct,' ' 2 an examination of the limited body of decisions, state practice,
municipal analogies, and accepted principles of the international legal
system leads to the conclusion that significant support exists for the prin-
ciple of joint and several liability in international law when more than
one breaching state owes a duty of compensation. Use of this principle
will depend on the nature of the claims that are raised and the character-
istics of the dispute resolution mechanisms employed to address these
claims.
I. Circumstances of Multiple State Responsibility
A. Basic Principles of State Responsibility
State responsibility arises when one state breaches its international law
duty by infringing on the rights of another state. The International Law
Commission ("I.L.C.") 3 adopted the following as its first and basic
2. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 456 (3d ed. 1979).
3. The I.L.C., established in 1947 by the General Assembly, drafts treaties and issues stud-
ies and reports on international topics. For discussion of the I.L.C.'s role as a contributor to
the development and codification of international law, see M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
92-93 (2d ed. 1986). The I.L.C. has consistently addressed the general rules of state responsi-
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statement on state responsibility: "Every internationally wrongful act of
a State entails the international responsibility of that State. '4 Thus, state
responsibility exists when:- "(a) Conduct consisting of an action or omis-
sion is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) That
conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State." 5
This article assumes that each state against which a claim of multiple
state responsibility might be brought has engaged in conduct attributable
to that state and that each state has breached an international obligation.
The fact that "[t]raditionally, international law is... essentially bilateral
bility rather than more specific substantive rules, the breach of which would lead to state
responsibility. See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of Its
Fifteenth Session, 6 May-12 July 1963, Annex I, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/152 (1963), reprinted in
[1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 227, 227-28, U.N. Doe A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/Add.1.
4. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-first Session, 14
May-3 August 1979, U.N. Doc. A/34/10 (1979), reprinted in [1979] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N,
91 (part 2), U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.1 (part 2) [hereinafter 1979 LL.C. Report].
The I.L.C. is also exploring an area that it terms "international liability," which concerns
liability of states for harmful transnational environmental effects of internationally lawful ac-
tivities. See Magraw, Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of
"International Liability," 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1986). The nature of the acts that would be
subject to international liability is controversial. Some commentators have criticized the no-
tion of a doctrinal division between state responsibility and international liability, maintaining
that cases of international liability can be treated as examples of ultrahazardous activities of
states under the existing doctrinal heading of state responsibility. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE,
supra note I, at 50. The I.L.C. is separately studying the non-navigational uses of interna-
tional watercourses, a topic that includes some activities that otherwise would fall within the
topic of international liability. See, e.g., Evensen, First Report on the Law of Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/367 (1983), reprinted in [1983] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N, 155 (part 1), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1983/Add.l(part 1).
5. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Twenty-fifth Session, 7
May-13 July 1973, U.N. Doc. A/9010/REV.l (1973), reprinted in [1973] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 161, 179, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1973/Add.1 (I.L.C. draft article-3). Ago,
writing as Special Rapporteur to the I.L.C., concluded that there is essential consensus in the
literature that these two elements-conduct attributable to a state (characterized as the "sub-
jective" element) and conduct constituting a breach of an international obligation (character-
ized as the "objective" element)-are the sole prerequisites of state responsibility. Ago, Second
Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233 (1970), reprinted in [1970] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 177, 187-88, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add.1.
Some commentators contend that "injury" or "damage" is also required. See, e.g., C.
AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 37, 55-56 (1967) (limited
to state responsibility for injury to aliens); de Ar~chaga, International Responsibility, in MAN-
UAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 9.01, at 534 (M. Sorenson ed. 1968). The breach of
any international obligation, however, entails at least moral or political injury. As Ago per-
suasively argues,
Every breach of an engagement vis-d-vis another State and every impairment of a subjec-
tive right of that State in itself constitutes a damage, material or moral, to that State. As
Anzilotti stated in his first work on the topic, international responsibility derives its raison
d'etre purely from the violation of a right of another State and every violation of a right is
a damage.
See Ago, supra, at 195 (referring to D. ANZILoTrI, TEORIA GENERALE DELLA RESPON-
SIBILITA, DELLA STATO NEL DIRrrrO INTERNAZIONALE 89 (1902)); accord B. BOLLECKER-
STERN, LE PRbJUDICE DANS LA THORIE DE LA REPONSABILITt INTERNATIONALE 36-49
(1973).
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minded"6 ought not suggest that a single event or set of facts may never
give rise to multiple relationships. The conduct of several states with
respect to one event may place each in a position of responsibility vis-a-
vis an injured state.
Following its breach of an international obligation, a state is under a
legal obligation to make appropriate amends. As Eagleton states, "Re-
sponsibility is simply the principle which establishes an obligation to
make good any violation of international law producing injury, commit-
ted by the respondent state."' 7 In the Chorzdw Factory case, the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice noted: "It is a principle of
international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation
to make reparation in an adequate form."8 The legal obligation to make
reparation must follow each breach of an international norm, even in
situations in which multiple states are in breach.
B. Multiple State Responsibility: Concerted or Independent Action
Multiple state responsibility may arise in numerous circumstances. 9 In
order to illustrate these circumstances and to facilitate analysis of the
consequences of this responsibility, it is helpful to organize the circum-
stances into two categories: concerted conduct and independent con-
duct. The first category involves situations in which states engage in
6. Riphagen, Third Report on the Content, Forms and Degrees of International Responsibil-
ity (Part 2 of the Draft Articles), U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/354 & Add.1-2 (1982), reprinted in [1982]
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 22, 36 (part 1), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (part 1)
(footnote omitted).
7. C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § 5, at 22
(1928). According to Eagleton,
Historically, the idea of a responsibility between states may be traced back to the vague
origins of rights and duties which have always been regarded as fundamental by mankind.
Among these is the conviction that reparation should be made for an injury committed;
and this idea of responsibility, whether between persons or states, is as old as morality
itself.
Id. § 4, at 16; see also Garcia-Amador, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of the State for
Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens, reprinted in F. GARCIA-
AMADOR, L. SOHN & R. BAXTER, RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPON-
SIBILITY FOR INJURY TO ALIENS vii, 8-9 (1974); Riphagen, Second Report on the Content,
Forms and Degrees of International Responsibility (Part 2 of the Draft Articles), U.N. Doe. A/
CN.4/344 (1981), reprinted in [1981] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, 79, 91 (part 1), U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/ 1981/Add.1 (part 1).
8. Chorz6w Factory Case (Claim for Indemnity; Jurisdiction) (Germ. v. Pol.), 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21. For a more detailed discussion of reparation and its relationship
to multiple state responsibility, see infra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
9. Joint responsibility may arise, for example, in cases of joint participation in breaches of
neutrality or acts of aggression, in cases of transferred or loaned officials or organs, in cases of
dependent states where the "dependent" state retains powers, in licensor-licensee cases, and in
cases in which the prior joint occupation or administration of territory leads to subsequent
joint conduct. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 189-92. In theory, however, the circum-
stances in which issues of multiple state responsibility may be implicated are far more diverse.
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concerted conduct in breach of an international obligation.10 To borrow
from municipal legal parlance, this is the circumstance of joint
tortfeasors participating in a common breach of obligation. For example,
two states may participate in a commercial joint venture that causes envi-
ronmental damage in a third state.II Or two states may conduct a
wrongful joint military invasion of a third state. In such situations, the
joint responsibility would arise from concerted action.
The second category consists of situations in which states engage in
independent breaches of obligation with respect to a single event. 12
Three examples illustrate situations in which independent breaches may
combine to contribute to one injury. First, a state may be responsible for
complicity when it renders aid to a state that breaches an obligation. The
I.L.C. has noted that complicity is properly characterized as a breach
independent of that of the recipient state, thus falling squarely in the
category of a distinct breach relating to a single event. 13 Second, several
states may independently pollute the environment in a way that, in the
aggregate, seriously damages another state.14 Third, consider a case in
which military agents of state A enter the territory of state B and, pursu-
ant to state A's orders, attack the diplomatic mission of state C.15
10. The I.L.C. distinguishes acts of assistance or participation from acts in concert: "[Tihe
parallel commission of identical offences by two or more States is altogether different from
participation by one of those states in an internationally wrongful act committed by the other."
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirtieth Session, 8 May-28
July 1978, U.N. Doc. A/33/10 (1978), reprinted in [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, 99 (part
2), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1 (part 2) [hereinafter 1978 LL.C. Report].
11. From the I.L.C.'s perspective, if no wrongfulness is involved, the example would in-
volve a case of international liability. See Magraw, supra note 4, at 329-30.
12. For discussion of the distinction between joint and independent tortfeasors, see gener-
ally P. JAMES & D. BROWN, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF TORTS 349-51 (4th ed.
1978); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
§§ 46-48, 52, at 322-32, 345 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS]; G.
WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE §§ 1-7, at 1-23 (1951); W. RoG-
ERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 604-06 (12th ed. 1984).
13. 1978 LL.C. Report, supra note 10, at 98-105. The issue of complicity concerns the
legal consequence of acts or omissions that assist another state in the breach of its international
obligations. Complicity is different from joint participation in a concerted act that is interna-
tionally wrongful. See supra note 10. In fact, the issue of complicity may arise when the
conduct of the assisting state, viewed independently, breaches no international legal rules.
1978 LL C. Report, supra note 10, at 99. For example, providing arms or military technology
or siting foreign forces on state territory may not violate any international obligation. When
such conduct helps another state to breach an international obligation (for example, by aggres-
sion), however, the otherwise innocent conduct may trigger state responsibility. See id.
"[T]he aid or assistance must have been rendered with intent to facilitate the commission of
that internationally wrongful act by another." Id. at 104 (emphasis in original).
14. For discussion of the wrongfulness of conduct causing environmental injury, see B.
SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT: THE RULES OF DECI-
SION 67-128 (1988).
15. For an example of an assertion of multiple responsibility against the actor organ's state
and the territorial state, consider the Soviet Union's protests to the United States, Turkey, and
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Responsibility for the attack certainly lies with state A. If, however,
state B has failed to exercise due diligence to prevent such conduct, it too
may be held responsible to state C. 16
In each of the preceding illustrations of independent breaches, the tar-
get state experienced a single injury. 17 The conduct of several responsi-
ble states, however, may lead to distinct types of injury. For example, a
state's blameworthiness for not punishing the perpetrators of a delict is
distinct from a state's responsibility for contributing to the original de-
lict. Consider a case involving the same facts as the last example in the
preceding paragraph, but assume (1) that the attackers are private citi-
zens of state A acting without state A's knowledge or approval who re-
turn home following the attack and (2) that state A has made no effort to
apprehend or punish the individuals. State B may still be responsible for
a failure of due diligence. The conduct of the private attackers, however,
cannot be attributed to state A. Yet state A may now bear responsibility
for breach of its independent obligation to punish. If a state's exercise of
due diligence could not have prevented a material injury, that state is
nevertheless responsible for the "moral" and "political" injury resulting
from the breach of its obligation of due diligence. 18 Hence, in this
West Germany regarding the launching of alleged reconnaissance balloons by the United states
from the territory of the latter two States. See Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of Its Twenty-seventh Session (5 May-25 July 1975), U.N. Doc. A/10010/REV.1
(1975), reprinted in [1975] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 47, 84, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1975/Add.l.
16. Reflecting the potential for dual responsibility, article 12 of the I.L.C. draft text states
that the acts of organs of one state in the territory of another state are not attributed to the
latter (without prejudice, however, to the possible breach by the latter of due diligence or other
obligations). See id. at 83; see also G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), annex art. 3(f)(1974), reprinted in
15 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 392, 392 (D. Djonovich ed. 1984) (listing among the acts
qualifying as acts of aggression "[tlhe action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has
placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of
aggression against a third State"). For further discussion of the consequences of a lack of due
diligence, see infra note 18 and accompanying text.
17. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, § 5, at 16 ("The damnum is single, but each commits a
separate injuria.").
18. When a duty to make reparation follows a breach of the duty to exercise due diligence
to prevent an injury, a causal relationship generally exists between the state's omission and the
harm resulting from private conduct. See, e.g., Case Concerning United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 31-33 (Iran could have prevented
attack on U.S. embassy); Kummerow, Otto Redler & Co., Fulda, Fischbach & Friedericy
Cases (Germ. v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 369, 400 (1903) (no responsibility because
no reasonable degree of diligence could have prevented damage by insurgents). A state's ex
post facto failure to punish, however, cannot logically have any direct causal connection with
the private conduct. Even if punishment is conceived of as a means of contributing to preven-
tion by enhancing respect for legal processes and deterring private wrongdoers, a causal rela-
tionship between a failure to punish and the prior conduct of the private offender is difficult to
draw. In such cases, the appropriate measure of compensation, therefore, remains in dispute.
Under one extreme perspective, logical but without support in the cases, compensation should
reflect only damages caused directly, i.e., the opportunity lost by the victim to recover damages
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example, out of a single set of facts, states A and B stand responsible to
state C for two quite different species of injury.
Even when the injury caused is single or undifferentiated, the conduct
of the several responsible states may differ materially in terms of its
blameworthiness or its causal contribution to the injury. 19 Such distinc-
tions based on blameworthiness or causal contribution should not ob-
scure the fact of multiple responsibility arising out of an event. The
consequences of responsibility may vary among the states based on such
distinctions, but each state should nonetheless be deemed to be
responsible.
C. Problems of Process
Before turning to the consequences of state responsibility, it is impor-
tant to identify and consider reasons for the paucity of legal claims and
from the wrongdoer because of the state's failure to punish; a judgment-proof offender, there-
fore, would mean no compensation. See Sohn & Baxter, Convention on the International Re-
sponsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens (Final Draft with Explanatory Notes), reprinted in
F. GARCIA-AMADOR, L. SOHN & R. BAXTER,, supra note 7, at 338-39. The Janes case repre-
sents a centrist approach, assessing damages for the victim's relatives' "indignity, grief, and
other similar wrongs" and for the general "mistrust and lack of safety" caused by the failure to
punish. Janes v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 82, 89 (1925).
But see 1 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-46 (1937) (criticizing the
Janes case). Most publicists, however, reject the search for an independent basis for damages,
concluding that the consequences of the private conduct that has gone unpunished or insuffi-
ciently punished should provide, at least, the basic guideline for the measure of reparation. See
Ago, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/264 & Add.l (1972-1973),
reprinted in [1972] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 71, 98, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1972/Add.I
(nonpunishment treated as failure to prevent); Brierly, The Theory of Implied State Complicity
in International Claims, 9 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 42, 49 (1928) (State assessed as a party to
conduct by "condonation"); Eagleton, Measure of Damages in International Law, 39 YALE
L.J. 52, 54-61 (1929) (all "due diligence" damages measured by private conduct conse-
quences); 1 M. WHITEMAN, supra, at 38-69 (empirical conclusion based on cases). Freeman
persuasively argues that the search for "causal" logic in the cases in this area is futile: the real
force that animates the decisions regarding the measure of damages is the desire to penalize the
state to deter future failures to punish. A. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE 622-23 (1938).
A similar set of questions as to the appropriate measure of compensation arises with respect
to other breaches in which a causal relationship to material injury is absent. Material injury is
not, after all, a requisite element of all breaches of international obligation. A state whose
conduct lacks a causal connection to material damage might still be responsible for breach of
an obligation and have certain consequential duties. These duties, however, would be unre-
lated to the material damage. If, for example, the exercise of due diligence would not have
prevented a material injury, the state is not responsible for the injury, but it should neverthe-
less stand responsible for the "moral" and "political" injury attendant to the breach of its
obligation of due diligence. For a discussion of injury and its consequences, see supra note 5;
infra text accompanying notes 56-61.
19. An insufficient causal connection, of course, may preclude responsibility for specific
harm. See infra note 55. Each of several causes of a single injury, however, may contribute in
unequal degrees. If the causal contribution of more than one state may be defined as proxi-
mate or material, multiple responsibility exists with respect to the injury.
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judicial and arbitral decisions concerning multiple state responsibility.
Such reasons relate to the process by which international claims arise and
are pursued. An examination of international legal process is essential
not only to an understanding of why the law regarding the circumstances
of multiple state responsibility is undeveloped, but also to an analysis of
the contours of a progressive regime that addresses the appropriate con-
sequences of multiple state responsibility.
First, and most important, the vast majority of international claims do
involve only two states-the victim state and the offending state. Signifi-
cantly, multiple responsibility is particularly rare in one area that has
dominated and influenced the jurisprudence of state responsibility-the
"treatment of aliens. ' 20 Furthermore, state responsibility claims based
on violation of a treaty or damage to property by armed forces most
often involve the wrongful conduct of only one state.21
Second, diplomatic initiatives asserting responsibility are far more
common than formal methods of dispute settlement. Diplomatic efforts
are most often and most effectively conducted on a bilateral basis.22
Even in situations of possible multiple state responsibility, the tendency
would be to make a single assertion of responsibility against the most
blatant, or perhaps politically accessible or responsive, wrongdoer. It
may also make diplomatic sense for a state to concede its sole responsibil-
ity for a wrongdoing rather than to resist such a concession and risk
reprisals or the uncertain outcome of a judicial or arbitral decision. 23 In
the Shuster incident, for example, the United States sent a diplomatic
note to Persia on behalf of a U.S. national for breach of the national's
20. Ago, First Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217(1969), reprinted in
[1969] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 125, 127, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1969/Add.1; I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 8-9.
21. Brownlie notes as evidence of the absence of a rule of joint and several liability that
claims against Axis powers were made against individual states, ignoring the common purpose
of Axis war efforts. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 456. But these "single" claims might have
expressed only a view as to the nature of the alliance; as to the specific subjects of the claims,
the conduct was not deemed concerted.
22. Most claims of state responsibility are made via diplomatic correspondence or con-
ducted through bilateral treaties settling outstanding claims. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra
note 1, at 90-123.
23. In addition, the decision to pursue arbitral or judicial solutions involves risks, includ-
ing the risks that the decisionmaker will not understand the issues or will be biased. The
formal legal pronouncements resulting from judicial or arbitral decisions may not address the
true underlying problems and tensions of which the legal dispute is only a symptom. States
may also believe that in a judicial dispute or arbitration a claimant either wins or loses,
whereas diplomacy allows compromise solutions. For more complete discussion of these is-
sues, see Bilder, Some Limitations ofAdjudication as an International Dispute Settlement Tech-
nique, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
3 (T. Carbonneau ed. 1984); Gross, Underutilization of the International Court of Justice, 27
HARV. INT'L L.J. 571, 591-96 (1986).
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contract with Persia.24 Persia agreed to settle, despite the fact that the
tortious acts of a superior power, Russia, had contributed to or induced
the breach of contract. Persia's payment may have been prompted by a
fear of reprisals had it attempted to place the blame on Russia. In addi-
tion, a state against which a diplomatic assertion has been made also may
be able to "save face" by payment ex gratia while stating that responsi-
bility lies with another state. In the 1881 Bey of Tunis dispute, for exam-
ple, Italy pressed a claim at a joint committee of inquiry investigating
whether injuries to Italian nationals and the Italian consulate at Sfax,
Tunisia, were the result of actions of French troops and French bom-
bardment, or of looting and theft by Tunisian insurgents. 25 Italy pressed
most strongly its claim against France. France, in response, stated that it
was willing to pay ex gratia, but argued that if a question of responsibil-
ity were involved, responsibility lay with Tunisia and not France.26 If a
state does not admit responsibility, yet makes an ex gratia payment to
another state that fully compensates for injuries suffered by the claimant
state's citizens, it is highly likely, for practical and political reasons, that
the claimant state will no longer pursue another responsible state.
Third, even if a decision is made to seek a judicial resolution, munici-
pal tribunals will probably be unavailable. Such fora will rarely hear
claims involving issues of state responsibility.27 Doctrines of sovereign
immunity or act of state, for example, would preclude most claims
against foreign states.28
Fourth, the procedures of available formal international mechanisms
of dispute settlement historically have reflected and perhaps reinforced
the practice of asserting only single state responsibility. Provisions gov-.
erning the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 29 terms of the International
24. Bdav6, Russia's Liability in Tortfor Persia's Breach of Contract, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 389,
407 (1912).
25. Ago, Third Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/246 & Add.1-3 (1971),
reprinted in [1971] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 199, 270-71 (part 1), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1971/Add.1 (part 1).
26. Id. at 271.
27. For discussion of an exception to this general proposition, see Anglo Chinese Shipping
Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 553, 554 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 938 (1955) (suit
brought against one state only), discussed infra text accompanying notes 70-73.
28. See, eg., M. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 266-79 (1988); M.
SHAW, supra note 3, at 372-93.
29. See Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907,
arts. 37-90, 36 Stat. 2199, 2220-34, T.S. No. 536, at 41-50, 205 Parry's T.S. 233, 240-48; Con-
vention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, arts. 15-57, 32 Stat.
1779, 1788-98, 187 Parry's T.S. 410, 416-22; see also M. HUDSON, PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, at §§ 1-32 (1943); S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT
14-19 (1962).
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Law Commission's Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, 30 and terms of
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States31 envision only single state responsibility.
The Statute of the International Court of Justice reflects the same as-
sumption of a two-party dispute in its procedures relating to provisional
measures, document production, and non-appearance. 32 A survey of the
types of arbitral tribunals authorized by twenty recent multilateral trea-
ties similarly reveals structures that assume two-party arbitrations. 33 Ar-
bitral tribunals have resisted procedural mechanisms that bring in
multiple parties, such as provisions for the consolidation of claims that
can be found in municipal judicial systems.34 One reason is that the com-
petence of arbitral tribunals cannot reach beyond the scope of the specific
arbitral clauses or agreements on which their competence is based. 35
30. See Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of Its Tenth Ses-
sion, 28 April-4 July 1958, U.N. Doc. A/3859, reprinted in [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 78,
82-86.
31. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nation-
als of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, art. 25, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 1280, T.I.A.S,
No. 6090, at 10, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 174; id. art. 37(2)(b), 17 U.S.T. at 1285, T.I.A.S. No. 6090,
at 15, 575 U.N.T.S. at 184.
32. See Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 41(1), 43(4), 53(1), 59 Stat. 1055,
1061-62; 3 Bevans 1179. The Court may approve intervention by other states pursuant to
article 62, but the Court's decision can bind only the parties. Id. art. 59; see also Case of the
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19, 33.
But see infra note 36 (discussing new joinder provision).
33. In addition to a few tribunals providing for a single arbitrator, Sohn has noted three
other basic types of arbitral tribunals: three-member tribunals, with one member selected by
"each side" and one neutral member; five-member tribunals, with one member selected by
each side and three neutral members; and five-member tribunals with two members selected by
each side and one neutral member. Sohn, The Role of Arbitration in Recent International
Mulilateral Treaties, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 171, 179 (1983).
34. An arbitral tribunal of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) recently noted
the absence of specific multiple respondent procedures in the ICC rules. The tribunal, how-
ever, made note of the benefits of such provisions. See Westland Helicopters Ltd. v, Arab Org.
for Industrialization, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Arab Brit. Helicop-
ter Co. (Interim Award on Jurisdiction, Mar. 5, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1071, 1088
(1984) ("It is indeed in the interest of good administration of justice to deliver a single decision
applicable to all, so as to avoid either contradictions or conflict between decisions."). Since the
case was filed in 1980, the ICC has adopted a short guide for multi-party arbitration that
focuses on large-scale construction, public works, and industrial projects and stresses the need
for a contractual basis for multi-party arbitration proceedings. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, GUIDE ON MULTI-PARTY ARBITRATION UNDER THE RULES OF THE ICC
COURT OF ARBITRATION (1982) [hereinafter ICC GUIDE].
35. See A. REDFERN & M. HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION 141-45 (1986); Bartels, Multiparty Arbitration Clauses, 2 J. INT'L
ARB. 61 (June 1985); Hascher, Consolidation of Arbitration by American Courts, 1 J. INT'L
ARB. 127 (Mar. 1984). If an arbitral procedure were consolidated in a manner not in accord-
ance with the agreement of the parties, recognition and enforcement of awards could be de-
nied. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, art. V(1)(d), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, at 4, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 40, 42;
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, June 21, 1985,
art. 36(1)(a)(iii)-(iv).
Joint and Several 'State Liability
These clauses and agreements reflect a bias towards bilateral dispute
resolution.
Although a few tribunals recently have adopted provisions for multi-
party dispute resolution, 36 they have rarely considered claims against
multiple states. 37 Conceptually, the issue of joint and several liability
may arise in cases in which compensation is sought and only one of sev-
eral responsible states is present before a tribunal.38 Without the pres-
ence of all states, however, the tribunal is not likely to address the issue
directly. Further, in some of the infrequent multiple party cases, no
compensation was sought. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, for
example, three states agreed to join two cases to allow the International
Court of Justice to determine principles to guide the parties in delimiting
maritime boundaries. 39 Responsibility for wrong was not at issue.
International judicial tribunals have almost always lacked procedures
that could allow the mandatory joinder of parties or compulsory jurisdic-
tion over multiple defendant states. One exception was the Central
American Court of Justice, which was in existence between 1907 and
1917. The Court had compulsory jurisdiction over all disputes submitted
to it by Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, or Costa Rica
36. In a 1978 revision of its rules, the International Court of Justice adopted article 47,
which states:
The Court may at any time direct that the proceedings in two or more cases be joined. It
may also direct that the written or oral proceedings, including the calling of witnesses, be
in common; or the Court may, without effecting any formal joinder, direct common ac-
tion in any of these respects.
International Court of Justice Rules of Court, art. 47 (1978); see also Treaty Establishing the
Caribbean Community, done July 4, 1973, annex art. 12(5), 946 U.N.T.S. 17, 32 (recognizing
the possibility of multiparty disputes in arbitrator selection provisions); London Court of In-
ternational Arbitration Rules, art. 13.1(c) (giving the tribunal power to "allow other parties to
be joined in the arbitration with their express consent, and make a single final award determin-
ing all disputes between them"); ICC GUIDE, supra note 34.
37. Exceptions are the Samoan Claims Arbitration (Germ. v. U.S. & U.K.), 9 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 15 (1902), see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text, and Westland Helicopters
Ltd. v. Arab Org. for Industrialization, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt,
Arab Brit. Helicopter Co. (Interim Award on Jurisdiction, Mar. 5, 1984), reprinted in 23
I.L.M. 1071 (1984).
A few instances of claims by multiple states against one state exist, although the claimant
states sometimes have been treated as a single party. See, e.g., M. HUDSON, supra note 29,
§§ 11-12, 24 (reviewing cases before tribunals of the Permanent Court of Arbitration). The
more typical practice involves the settlement of claims by bilateral agreement or bilateral arbi-
tration, even where several states have been involved in an incident. See, e.g., 1 R. LILLICH &
B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS
166-67 (1975) (discussing bilateral agreements between the U.A.R. and Great Britain and the
U.A.R. and France arising out of 1956 deprivative measures taken by Egypt).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89 (discussing the Corfu Channel case).
39. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3. The
Court did not feel compelled to reach identical conclusions as to the joined cases, since they
concerned different areas of the North Sea continental shelf. Id at 19.
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that had not been resolved by the foreign offices of these states.40 During
the ten years of its operation, however, the Court considered only one
case involving a claim against more than one state.41 In that case, which
involved Honduras' claim for compensation against Guatemala and El
Salvador for fomenting a revolution in Honduras, the Court ruled for
Guatemala and El Salvador on the merits. The Court thus did not need
to rule on whether the two states would be jointly and severally liable.
The development of more systems of compulsory dispute resolution is
unlikely unless states overcome their reluctance to submit to binding ju-
dicial or arbitral dispute resolution.42
Fifth, even if procedural obstacles are overcome, an arbitral or judicial
tribunal may not have the competence to reach a decision on compensa-
tion or the possibility of joint and several liability. For example, the par-
ties in their compromis may restrict the types of reparation the tribunal is
entitled to award, perhaps limiting the tribunal's competence to the dec-
laration of substantive rights. As Mann states,
[I]t must be emphasized that, whatever form of reparation the claimant
State may be entitled to claim, it may be satisfied with something less or
different and that the question of remedies is to be clearly distinguished
from that of entitlement. Remedies depend on the jurisdiction and proce-
dure of the tribunal. They may not always coincide with the substantive
right.
43
40. Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, done Dec.
20, 1907, art. 1, 3 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 3) 105, 106. The Court also had com-
pulsory jurisdiction in cases brought by an individual of one state against any other state. Id.
art. 2. See generally H. CORY, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
90-98 (1972); M. HUDSON, supra note 29, §§ 39-62; Hill, CentralAmerican Court of Justice, 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (1981).
41. Hond. v. Guat. & El Sal. (1908), translated in 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 434-36, 729-36 (1909).
42. For critical reviews of the experience of the International Court of Justice with its
compulsory jurisdiction, see Janis, Somber Reflections on the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 144 (1987); Janis, The Role of the International Court
in the Hostages Crisis, 13 CONN. L. REV. 263 (1981); Scott & Carr, The ICI and Compulsory
Jurisdiction: The Case for Closing the Clause, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987); see also Fitzmau-
rice, Enlargement of the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court, in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 461, 463 (L. Gross ed. 1976) (arguing that states prefer
not to submit disputes to the I.C.J. or other forms of formal dispute resolution for reasons of
"political psychology"); Gross, supra note 23, at 596-97 (arguing that the I.C.J.'s location at
the Hague, its differentiation between justiciable and nonjusticiable disputes, and governments'
fears of "losing control" are not sufficient explanations for underutilization of the I.C.J., and
that "[lack of confidence in the composition of the Court, the law which it applies and the
manner in which it carries out its judicial functions have been significant factors in the... non-
use of the [C]ourt").
43. Mann, The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and National
Law, 48 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1977); accord de Ar~chaga, supra note 5, § 9.22 (indicating
that international arbitral tribunals have refrained from imposing punitive damages since they
go "beyond the jurisdiction conferred on them by the parties" and are "incompatible with the
basic idea underlying the duty of reparation"); Riphagen, supra note 7, at 83-85.
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Sixth, and more generally, the law of state responsibility is less well
developed than international law in other areas. In the commercial area,
for example, states have long considered it to be in their long-term self-
interest to agree in advance upon rules that create a stable environment
for trade and commerce. In the area of state responsibility, however,
specific obligations and the consequences of breaches have less frequently
been specified in advance. For example, examination of existing treaties
related to the prevention of maritime collisions or marine or river pollu-
tion reveals that, even though the interaction of states and the occurence
of damage is foreseeable in such situations, states have resisted defining
with precision the details of liability.44 To date, incentives for the adop-
tion of a more mature system of joint and several liability have been
inadequate.
Finally, it may be that inertia in international practice has slowed the
assertion of claims of multiple state responsibility. The pattern of state
assertions of single responsibility, even in circumstances suggesting mul-
tiple responsibility, is so familiar and well-established as to discourage
deviation.
The fact that practice has generally reflected a rudimentary approach
to state responsibility does not deny the propriety of more complex
claims consistent with established principles of responsibility. As the In-
ternational Court of Justice has observed, "There is no obligation upon
the possessors of rights to exercise them. Sometimes no remedy is
sought, though rights are infringed. To equate this with the creation of a
vacuum would be to equate a right with an obligation. '' 45 If more than
one state breaches its international obligations in the course of an event,
44. Such treaties typically require parties, among other things, to inform the other parties
of accidents, to consult each other on matters of risk, to undertake national legislative pro-
grams to reduce risk, and to establish investigative commissions. See, eg., Convention on the
Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution, Dec. 3, 1976, 16 LL.M. 242 (1977); Con-
vention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, June 4, 1974, 13
I.L.M. 352 (1974); Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Measures Dealing with Pollution of
Oil by Sea, Sept. 16, 822 U.N.T.S. 311 (1972); Agreement for the Cooperation in Dealing with
Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, June 9, 1969, 704 U.N.T.S. 4 (1969); Convention Concern-
ing the Regime of Navigation on the Danube, Aug. 18, 1948, 33 U.N.T.S. 181 (1949); see also
Int'l Law Association, Report of the Sixtieth Conference Held at Montreal (1983) (proposals
concerning transfrontier pollution and drainage basin rules do not discuss multiple state re-
sponsibility or its consequences). A notable exception to the failure to specify in advance the
consequences of multiple state responsibility is the Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Space Objects Convention]. See infra notes 77-87 and accompany-
ing text.
45. Case Concerning Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Second Phase) (Belg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 45; accord Mann, supra note 43, at 14 ("[A] wrong committed by the
standards of objective law does not become a right by virtue of the impossibility of pursuit or
unwillingness to pursue it.").
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each breaching state is in a position of responsibility vis-A-vis the injured
state. As the variety and frequency of cooperative state endeavors and
the interaction of technological activities expand, international rules and
processes must develop to address situations of multiple state
responsibility. 46
II. Consequences of State Responsibility
The juridical consequence of the breach of any international obligation
is the creation of a duty to make reparation. 47 The language of the Per-
manent Court of International Justice in the Chorzdw Factory case repre-
sents the classic articulation of the content of this duty:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act-a
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in par-
ticular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals-is that reparation must, as far
as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish
the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed.48
Three categories of reparation exist: restitution, compensation, and
satisfaction. Although inconsistent terminology in the literature has
blurred the boundaries of these categories,49 it is possible to define the
core nature of each. Restitution, in the broad sense of restitutio in in-
tegrum, represents the obligation to eliminate the effects of the breach-
to restore the situation to its pre-breach state. Restitution in kind, the
return of persons or property wrongfully taken, constitutes a specific sub-
set of the general restitutio obligation. ° In certain cases, of course,
46. See Magraw, supra note 4, at 329-30 (citing examples of joint state activities that may
lead to harm in other states and suggesting that the I.L.C. should focus on joint activities in its
future studies).
47. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
48. Chorz6w Factory Case (Merits) (Germ. v. Pol0.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No, 17, at 47;
accord, e.g., Opinion in the Lusitania Cases (U.S. v. Ger.), 7 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 32, 35
(1923). For discussion of reparation, see generally I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 457-64; I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 199-240; B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW As APPLIED
BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 233-40 (1953); J. PERSONNAZ, LA R9PARA-
TION DU PR15JUDICE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1938); 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 653-81 (3d ed. 1957); de Ar~ehaga, supra note 5, §§ 9.17-.23; Eagleton,
supra note 18; Mann, supra note 43, at 1-5; Riphagen, supra note 7, at 87-100. See also Gray,
Is There an International Law of Remedies?, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 25, 30-31 (urging the need
to stress state practice and to avoid a court-centered view when investigating the consequences
of breaches of international law).
49. As to the terminological confusion, see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 457-58;
Riphagen, supra note 7, at 88.
50. Another subset of restitutto in integrum is legal' restitution. Thus, for example, a
state's declaration that its action violates international law may be considered broadly as a
form of legal restitution, necessary for the victim state to achieve full reparation. See I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 461-63. See generally Mann, supra note 43, at 2-5. The potential
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restitution in kind may be inapplicable or impossible given the nature of
the breach and its consequences. Restitution in kind "should be dis-
carded when there is absolute impossibility of envisaging specific per-
formance, or when an irreversible situation has been created."' s
Payment of compensation may be required when it is needed as a sup-
plement to restitution, when restitution in kind is impossible, or when it
is prohibited by a compromis.5 2 Chorzdw Factory summarizes the princi-
.ple of compensation:
Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum correspond-
ing to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need
be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution
in kind or payment in place of it-such are the principles which should
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to
international law.
53
Viewing restitution in kind as the primary right of a claimant state vis-A-
vis a responsible state may affect the measure of the compensation obliga-
tion. To the extent monetary compensation represents a substitute for
restitution in kind, the cost of replacement of damaged property, rather
than the property's value at the time of accident, may well be the appro-
priate measure.54 Issues of causation, remoteness, and foreseeability also
play a key role in the delimitation of damages attributable to the breach
and, thus, compensable by the breaching state.5 5 Particular problems are
overlap of the concepts of legal restitution and satisfaction is apparent. To maintain the integ-
rity of the distinction, it is perhaps best to characterize only legal acts that directly remedy the
wrong (such as a declaration rescinding wrongful legislation) as legal restitution.
51. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./Cal. Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan
Arab Republic (Compensation for Nationalized Property), para. 112, 17 I.L.M. 1, 36 (R. Du-
puy arb. 1978).
52. Riphagen argues that when the injury to the state is through an injury to a national,
the state responsible should have the option of restitution or compensation. Riphagen, supra
note 7, at 94-96, 99-100. This argument is of particular relevance to wrongful expropriation.
Conversely, some commentators have suggested that the claimant state has the option to elect
either compensation or restitution. See, e.g., 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 48, at 660.
For discussion of the uncertainty in the literature as to whether restitution is available by right
in the nationalization context, see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 210-22.
53. Chorz6w Factory Case (Merits) (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47.
For discussion of the issue of damages in Chorzdw Factory, see 2 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1529-46 (1937).
54. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./Cal. Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan
Arab Republic (Compensation for Nationalized Property), para. 105, 17 I.L.M. 1, 35 (R. Du-
puy arb. 1978); de Ar~ehaga, supra note 5, § 9.18.
55. For a general discussion of the basic requirement that the harm for which the state is
deemed responsible must bear a material causal relationship to the state's conduct, see B.
BOLLECKER-STERN, supra note 5, at 180-359; B. CHENG, supra note 48, at 241-53; 3 M.
WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1767-1832 (1943). A variety of causal fac-
tors and the nature of the primary obligations that are breached also may affect the measure of
damages. See Riphagen, Fourth Report on the Content, Forms and Degrees of International
Responsibility (Part 2 of the Draft Articles), U.N. Doc A/CN.4/366/Add. 1 (1983), reprinted
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encountered in the assessment of the measure of the award when the
injury experienced is non-material or only involves the "moral" or
"political" injury attendant to every breach of an obligation.5 6 Few
guidelines help to quantify loss when the breach consists, for example, of
a violation of territory or, perhaps, a failure to punish, when no economic
loss has occurred.57
Satisfaction, the third form of reparation, is often associated with such
non-material injuries.58 Satisfaction is not used only in moral or political
injury cases. Nor is it used to the'exclusion of other forms of reparation
in such cases. 59 The forms of satisfaction may include formal apology or
declaration of responsibility, guarantees against repetition, punishment
of individual actors, and other measures fashioned appropriately to the
facts. 60 And, as Brownlie logically suggests, pecuniary awards predomi-
nantly designed to express apology are properly viewed as cases of satis-
faction rather than compensation in the strict sense.61
Another obvious obligation relating to responsibility rarely receives
specific mention in the literature: the duty to stop the conduct constitut-
ing a breach of obligation. As Riphagen, writing as a Special Rapporteur
to the I.L.C., submits, "It does not seem relevant whether one considers
this duty as a consequence of the continuing 'validity' or 'force' of the
primary obligation or as a duty which arises as a consequence of the
breach."' 62 Nor, if defined as a consequential obligation, does it matter
whether the duty is viewed as subsumed in the notion of restitutio in
in [1983] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 3, 7 (part 1), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1983/Add.I (part
1) (arguing that "proportionality" exists between, on the one hand, the source, content, and
purpose of an obligation, and the circumstances of individual cases in which an internationally
wrongful act has been committed, and, on the other hand, the legal consequences flowing from
the breach of the obligation); infra note 64 and accompanying text.
56. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 199.
57. See I M. WHITEMAN, supra note 18, at 42-44.
58. See, e.g., Garcia-Amador, International Responsibility: Sixth Report, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/124 & Add.l (1961), reprinted in [1961] 2 Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 1, 19-20, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/Ser.A/1961/Add. 1.
59. See, e.g., I'm Alone Case (Can. v. U.S.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1609 (1933 & 1935) 1
M. WHITEMAN, supra note 18, at 155 (both apology and cash award recommended as "mate-
rial amends" for wrongful sinking of vessel); I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, 460-61.
60. For discussion of the nature of satisfaction, see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 208-09;
1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 48, at 658-59; de Ar6chaga, supra note 5, at § 9.23;
Riphagen, supra note 7, 89-91, 98-99.
61. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 459; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 223. Thus, an
affront to territory, with no further material consequences, might yield an apology payment
properly denominated "satisfaction." Payments arising out of a failure to punish present a
more difficult case because of the differing perspectives on the character of the "injury" caused.
See supra note 18.
62. Riphagen, supra note 7, at 87.
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integrum or as an independent remedy. Without question, a state in a
position of responsibility must cease its violative conduct. 63
The selection of the appropriate form of reparation in a particular
case, of course, depends on the facts, i.e., the specific nature of the breach
and its consequences. 4 This article does not consider the manner in
which the suitable measure or type of reparation is determined. Rather,
the concern is with how circumstances of multiple state responsibility
affect the determination of reparation.
With respect to all forms of reparation other than pecuniary compen-
sation, the circumstances of multiple state responsibility should exert no
effect on the determination of reparation. Consider the example of an
attack by representatives of state A on the diplomatic mission of state B
in the territory of state C. Assume that official documents are stolen,
hostages are taken, and state C has failed to exercise due diligence to
prevent the attack. The analysis of the appropriate forms of reparation,
other than compensation, due to state B from states A and C is the same
whether the assertion is of single or multiple responsibility. As to state
A, in either procedural posture the initial duty is to cease the wrongful
conduct-to release the hostages and return the documents. Application
of the principle of restitutio in integrum also, of course, could lead to the
duty of restoration. Appropriate measures of satisfaction, including per-
haps formal apology and a token payment to support such apology,
could also be required. The analysis with respect to state C is similar. If
one views the breach of obligation as a general failure to provide ade-
quate protection to diplomats, state C must cease the violative conduct
by providing due protection. In any event, satisfaction might be de-
manded in the form of an apology, token payment, and perhaps a guar-
antee of future protection. The measures of noncompensatory reparation
required of each breaching state may be determined independently in a
multiple responsibility situation.
Compensation, on the other hand, requires consideration of the cir-
cumstances of multiple state responsibility. By definition, a principal ob-
63. See also International Law Commission Summary Records of the Thirty-third Session,
[1981] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 136, 137, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981 (comments of
Mr. Pinto) [hereinafter 1981 Summary Records]. The essence of the I.L.C. approach toward
international liability, see supra note 4, may be that freedom of action requires that certain
"lawful" injury-producing activities be allowed to continue as long as compensation is paid.
"Wrongfulness," the touchstone of state responsibility, however, traditionally has connoted
prohibition of injury. See B. SMITH, supra note 14, at 122.
64. See Riphagen, supra note 55, at 7; Riphagen, supra note 7, at 88-89, 93; supra notes
49-61 and accompanying text. The consequences of wrongfulness and state responsibility need
not invariably lead to a rule of prohibition of wrongful injury. See B. SMrrH, supra note 14, at
122-23; 1981 Summary Records, supra note 63, at 251 (comments of Mr. Aldrich).
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jective of compensation is to make whole the state that has experienced
loss. The aggregate compensation received by the injured state ought not
exceed the measure of that loss, even when the conduct of more than one
state bears a causal connection to the injury.65 Compensation also ought
not result in the unjust enrichment of victim states.66 But how is the
burden of compensation to be borne? Will one state be jointly and sever-
ally liable to the injured state? It is to this rather unexplored territory
that the discussion now turns.
III. Joint and Several Liability: State Practice
Examples of state practice in the area of multiple state responsibility,
although few, are nonetheless highly instructive. The Samoan Claims
arbitration, for example, represents implicit support for the general con-
clusion that joint enterprises that cause injury share responsibility for
compensation. 67 In particular, the tribunal assigned responsibility to the
United States and the United Kingdom in settlement of claims for inju-
ries to German citizens resulting from joint U.S.-U.K. military activities
in Samoa at the turn of the century. Although the tribunal reached no
final decision with respect to the allocation or sharing of responsibility, 68
the two states subsequently agreed each to pay one-half of the sums
found to be owed to the subjects of other states, and each to assume sole
responsibility for injuries to its own citizens. 69
The issue of joint and several liability of states has been discussed in a
few more recent cases and arbitral decisions. Although these cases sup-
port the proposition that multiple responsibility may exist, they generally
have reached results that did not demand a decision on whether one of
several breaching states would be responsible for the full amount of the
damages. In Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, for example, a
Hong Kong corporation asserted a claim against the United States for
the use of a vessel seized by Japan during World War II and retained
65. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory
Opinion), 1949 I.C.J. 174, 186; Chorz6w Factory Case (Merits) (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 17, at 49; Garcia-Amador, supra note 58, at 43-44.
66. See Cook Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 213, 217 (1927) (Van Vol-
lenhoven, concurring); Fabiani Case (Fr. v. Venez.) (1896), quoted in 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra
note 55, at 1786; Garcia-Amador, supra note 58, at 44; cf Chorz6w Factory Case (Merits)
(Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 31.
67. Samoan Claims Arbitration (Germ. v. U.S. & U.K.), 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 15 (1902);
see 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 55, at 1778-81.
68. The arbitrator "reserv[ed] for a future Decision the question as to the extent to which
the two Governments, or each of them, may be considered responsible" for the losses. 9 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards at 27. The reserved question was never decided.
69. See Penfield, The Settlement of the Samoan Cases, 7 Arm. J. INT'L L. 767, 770 (1913).
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until 1950 by order of the Allied forces occupying Japan.70 The U.S.
Court of Claims denied the claim, holding that Japan retained
"possession" of the vessel at all times, notwithstanding the ultimate au-
thority of the Allies over the use and disposition of the vessel.71 But the
Court also noted in dictum that the United States could not, in any
event, be deemed solely responsible for Allied conduct:
The occupation of Japan was a joint venture, participated in by the United
States of America, the United Kingdom, China, and Russia; and whatever
benefit the occupying powers derived from the use of plaintiff's vessel in the
laying and repairing of submarine cables was derived by all of them in com-
mon and not by any one more than another.72
Hence, implicit in the Court's decision is the notion that responsibility
for the conduct of the several states acting in concert would be multiple
and shared. Although the Court went on to note the uniform municipal
rule of joint and several liability, it found no need to decide "whether this
rule should be applied to sovereign nations engaged in a joint
enterprise. '73
Assertions of joint and several liability have been made in other cases.
In the Case of the Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United
States of America,74 the United States asserted joint and several responsi-
bility in its separate pleadings against Hungary and the Soviet Union
before the International Court of Justice. The United States demanded
from each state the full measure of damages arising out of the alleged
cooperation of Hungary and the Soviet Union in the interception and
detention of a U.S. military plane and its crew. 75 The claimant in
70. Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 553 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 938 (1955).
71. Id. at 557. One may make a credible argument that this case provides an example of a
case in which responsibility was denied because a more "blameworthy" party was not before
the court. In fact, however, both the defendant and the third party might properly have been
deemed responsible. See generally infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
72. 127 F. Supp. at 554.
73. Id. at 557. In subsequent U.S. cases involving claims for money damages against the
United States when the United States allegedly had contributed with other governments to
cause injury, plaintiffs have pursued claims under U.S. law. Thus, in a number of takings
cases, U.S. courts have held that, if the United States has a "sufficiently direct and substantial"
involvement with the injury-causing activity of another state, a taking has occurred under U.S.
law and the United States is liable. See, e.g., Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing, inter alia, Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457 (Ct. Cl. 1953),
and Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 553 (Ct. Cl. 1955), in support
of this proposition). No consideration has been given explicitly to international law. See, e.g.,
id. at 1573.
74. (U.S. v. Hung.), 1954 I.C.J. 99 (Order of July 12, 1954); (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1954 I.C.J.
103 (Order of July 12, 1954).
75. Application Instituting Proceedings Against the Hungarian People's Republic (U.S. v.
Hung.), 1954 I.C.J. Pleadings (Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of
America) 8-10, 38-39 (Feb. 16, 1954); Application Instituting Proceedings Against the Union
Yale Journal of International Law
Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organization for Industrialization,
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt & Arab British Heli-
copter Co., a recent multiparty arbitration involving breach of contract
claims, similarly alleged that the states named were jointly and severally
liable.7
6
The most fertile area of state practice on the subject of multiple party
compensation in cases of concerted activity relates to activities in outer
space. Specifically, the 1972 Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects7 7 sets forth concrete provisions regard-
ing multiple responsibility. Article V of the Convention provides that the
states jointly participating in the launch of a space object "shall be jointly
and severally liable for any damage caused."' 78 States deemed to be
jointly participating in a launch include states engaging in or procuring a
launch and states from whose territory or facility the launch occurs.79 A
right of contribution among the launching states is then established: "A
launching state which has paid compensation for damage shall have the
right to present a claim for indemnification to other participants in the
joint launching." 80 Prior to the Convention, there was substantial dis-
course in the literature as to whether the state from whose territory an
object is launched or the state whose facility is used for launching ought
to share the full burden of joint and several responsibility.81 Debate on
of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1954 I.C.J. Pleadings (Treatment in Hungary
of Aircraft Crew of United States of America) 42, 43-44, 58-59 (Feb. 16, 1954). The Court
dismissed the proceedings because neither Hungary nor the Soviet Union had consented to the
Court's jurisdiction. Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America
(U.S. v. Hung.) 1954 I.C.J. 99, 101 (Order of July 12, 1954); Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft
and Crew of United States of America (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1954 I.C.J. 103, 105 (Order of July
12, 1954).
76. (Interim Award on Jurisdiction, Mar. 5, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1071, 1074-75(1984). Although the parties agreed to conduct the arbitration under Swiss law, it is possible
that Swiss law would look to international law to determine whether joint and several liability
applied to States. See generally Bowett, Claims Between States and Private Entities: The Twi-
light Zone of International Law, 35 CATH. U.L. Rav. 929 (1986).
77. Space Objects Convention, supra note 44.
78. Id. art. V(1). For similar liability rules in analogous contexts, see article 4 of the Inter-
national Maritime Organization's recent Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in
Connexion with the Carriage of Noxious and Hazardous Substances by Sea, I.M.O. Doc.
LEG/CONF.6/3 (Jan. 13, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 150, 153 (1984) (joint and several
liability of shipowners when damage not reasonably separable) [hereinafter Draft I.M.O. Con-
vention], and article 3(5) of the European Convention on Products Liability in Regard to
Personal Injury and Death (Council of Europe), opened for signature Jan. 27, 1977, reprinted
in 16 I.L.M. 7, 8 (1977) (several liability for defective products).
79. Space Objects Convention, supra note 44, arts. I(c), V(3).
80. Id. art. V(2).
81. See, e.g., C. JENKS, SPACE LAW 283-85 (1965); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I.
VLASiC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 613-20 (1963); J-D. TH-RAULAZ, DROIT DE
L'tSPACE ET R-ESPONSABLIT- 264-69 (1971); Malik, Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Activities, 6 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 335, 348-53 (1966). Article 7 of the Treaty on Principles
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the subject continued throughout the course of the Convention proceed-
ings, with several states proposing variations on the theme of subsidiary
or secondary liability.8 2 The final text of the Convention, however, re-
flects the view that although participating states may choose to apportion
liability unevenly by inter se agreement, joint and several liability is ap-
propriate for the protection of the injured state.83 Article V(2) reads:
The participants in a joint launching may conclude agreements regarding
the apportioning among themselves of the financial obligation in respect of
which they are jointly and severally liable. Such agreements shall be with-
out prejudice to the right of a State sustaining damage to seek the entire
compensation due under this Convention from any or all of the launching
States which are jointly and severally liable.84
The Space Objects Convention also embraces joint and several liability
with respect to compensation by independent wrongdoers. Article IV
provides that a third party injured as a consequence of the collision of
two space objects may claim compensation for the total injury from any
or all of the "launching States" of either space object.8 5 One distinctive
characteristic of the regime is that, vis-A-vis an injured third party, the
launching states of space objects are categorically deemed responsible.
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2415, T.I.A.S. No.
6347, at 6, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 209, imposed liability on four categories of states (launching
states, states procuring launchings, states from whose territory an object is launched, and
states whose facility is used for launching), but failed explicitly to refer to the nature of the
"shared" liability. See also Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), art. 8 (1963), reprinted in 9
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONs 205, 205-06 (D. Djonovich ed. 1974) (joint and several liabil-
ity not specified as a consequence).
82. For discussion of the debate on joint and several liability, see sources cited in Cheng,
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 83,
120 n.226 (N. Jasentuliyana & R. Lee eds. 1979); Foster, The Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 137, 163 n.84 (1972).
Many proposals suggested that the state from whose territory the object was launched should
be liable only if the states launching or procuring the launch are not parties to the treaty. See,
e.g., Proposal Concerning the State Responsible and Joint and Several Responsibility, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.36, 10 June 1968 (France); Proposal, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.39,
12 June 1968 (Australia). In the International Maritime Organization's recent Draft Hazard-
ous Substances Carriage Convention a regime of subsidiary liability is presupposed for ship-
pers: shippers may be jointly and severally liable among themselves, but only if a shipowner is
unable or not required to pay full compensation. See Draft I.M.O. Convention, supra note 78,
art. 7.
83. See N. MATTE, AEROSPACE LAW: FROM SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION TO COMMER-
CIAL UTILIZATION 162 (1977); Wiewiorowska, Some Problems of State Responsibility in Outer
Space Law, 7 J. SPACE L. 23, 29-30 (1979).
84. Space Objects Convention, supra note 44, art. V(2). This provision tracks the munici-
pal model of compensation obligations in the context of concerted activities. See infra notes
118-122, 135-36, 148 and accompanying text.
85. Space Objects Convention, supra note 44, art. IV; see Cheng, supra note 82, at 121-22;
Foster, supra note 82, at 167-68.
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Even if one launching state is responsible and exclusively at fault, an-
other launching state would be liable to the injured third state for the
entire amount of compensation.8 6 As between the two launching states,
the Convention adopts a regime of contribution based on comparative
fault. "[T]he burden of compensation for the damage shall be appor-
tioned between the first two States in accordance with the extent to
which they were at fault; if the extent of the fault of each of these States
cannot be established, the burden of compensation shall be apportioned
equally between them."'8 7
The issue of joint and several liability may arise when only one of two
or more states that has caused an injury is before a court or arbitral
tribunal. The compensatory obligations of one member of such an enter-
prise, in an action against only that member, are unaffected by another
state's complicity. Brownlie, commenting on the Corfu Channel case, 8
notes that, in imposing liability on Albania, the International Court of
Justice was "untroubled by the possibility that another State [Yugoslavia,
acting in concert with Albania, according to British submissions] had
laid the mines in Albanian waters. ' '8 9 Given the Court's conclusions that
(1) the authors of the mine laying were unknown and (2) Albania's
breach was in knowingly allowing its territory to be used to harm other
states, the decision may point to several liability among independent
wrongdoers for the entire amount of compensation.
Joint and several liability of course will not be imposed in a multiple
state situation if only one state is in fact responsible for an injury. In
"transferred servant" cases, for example, in which officials of one state
have acted wrongfully under the complete direction and authority of a
second state to which the officials were "loaned," the second state has
been deemed solely responsible. Ago describes the governing principle in
such cases as follows: "[A]n act or omission committed by the organ of
one State in the performance of functions on behalf of another State, in
whose interests it has been requested to act, must be considered at the
international level as an act of that other State." 90 Similarly, in
86. Absolute (no-fault) liability governs compensation for damage on the earth's surface or
to aircraft. Space Objects Convention, supra note 44, art. IV(l)(a). Fault on the part of at
least one of the colliding objects is a prerequisite to liability for damage to other space objects.
Id. art. IV(1)(b).
87. Id. art. IV(2). Fawcett states that the responsibility of constituent member states for
the wrongful conduct of international organizations-a topic beyond the scope of this article-
depends on the specific "constitutive instrument." J. FAWCETT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USES OF OUTER SPACE 46 (1968).
88. Corfu Channel Case (Merits) (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
89. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 456.
90. Ago, supra note 25, at 269.
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"dependent state" cases, the dependent state typically has been exoner-
ated without even an acknowledgment of the possibility of multiple re-
sponsibility. Thus, Ago states, "[W]henever a State has been held
indirectly responsible for the act of another State, the former has always
been required to answer in place of the second and not in parallel with
it."91 Although multiple state responsibility may exist and joint and sev-
eral liability could be a consequence in dependent states cases-if, for
example, a dependent state retains freedom of action92-claims typically
have not been pressed against all possible wrongdoing states in such
cases.
93
International practice also indicates that a state's liability will be equi-
tably adjusted if non-state actions have contributed to an injury. When
multiple independent causes have led to divisible damage and the portion
of the damage for which a particular state is responsible is evident, the
state will be liable only for that portion.94 In addition, when multiple
independent causes have contributed to an undifferentiated total damage,
when only one of the causes appears to have been the illicit acts of a
state, and when the state's actions alone did not cause the full damage,
international tribunals have not held the breaching state liable for the full
damage.95 Although the United States was required to pay compensa-
tion for damage caused by a crew on shore leave in the Zafiro case, for
example, interest was disallowed based on a finding that a portion of
91. Ago, Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/318 & Add. 1-4 (1979),
reprinted in [1979] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 3, 26 (part I), U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/
Add. 1 (part 1) (emphasis in original).
92. "La logique et l'6quit6 exigeraient que les Etats qui se trouve dans [une] situation
d6pendante ne fussent responsables de leurs actes A 1'6gard des gouvernements &rangers qu'en
proportion de leur libert6 d'action." 1 F. DE MARTENS, TRAITt DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
379 (A. L6o trans. 1883); see Chevreau Case (Fr. v. U.K.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1113 (1931);
R.E. Brown Case, 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 120 (1923); Prince Sliman Bey v. Minister for For-
eign Affairs, [1959] D. JUR. 357 (Trib. admin. Paris 1959), translated in 28 Int'l L. Rep. 79
(1963); see also 1979 LLC. Report, supra note 4, at 105 ("I[T]he attribution of international
responsibility for a State which has the power of direction or control over a certain area of the
activities of another State or which has coerced another State into committing a wrongful act
should not automatically preclude the responsibility of the State subject to that power or
coercion.").
93. See Restitution of Household Effects Belonging to Jews Deported from Hungary (Ger-
many) Case (Berlin Ct. App. 1965), translated in 44 Int'l L. Rep. 301 (1972) (Germany exon-
erated though clearly a co-participant and catalyst to Hungarian conduct because Hungary
was more responsible); I. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 187-88.
94. See Alliance Case (U.S. v. Venez.), 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 140, 143 (1903) (damages
for physical harm to vessel attributable to storm, and damages for detention of vessel attributa-
ble to wrongfully detaining state).
95. For discussion of such "complementary" or concurrent causes, each of which causes a
part of the damage, see B. BOLLECKER-STERN, supra note 5, at 281-85.
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claimed looting damage was caused by unidentified wrongdoers. 96
Compensation in the Martini case was also reduced to a fraction of the
total damages experienced by a foreign company during the Venezuelan
civil war.97 In that case, two independent causes, the acts of revolution-
aries and the fact of a condition of war, combined with the state's wrongs
to produce the injury.
Cases in which damage awards have been reduced because the injured
state contributed to its own injury illustrate an important final point. In-
ternational tribunals have long engaged in precisely the type of analysis
of relative or proportional responsibility essential to any regime contem-
plating several liability or a right of contribution. As Judge Azevedo
noted in dissent in the Coifu Channel case, for example, when the injured
state contributes to the occurrence of its own injury, "the conduct of the
victim can be taken into account by reducing the degree of responsibility
[of the offending state] and consequently apportioning the damages."98
Although certain earlier international decisions reflected an older, com-
mon law view denying any responsibility in the event of a contribution by
the injured party,99 many more recent examples in international judicial
practice demonstrate acceptance of the principle of comparative appor-
tionment of compensation in circumstances of contributory conduct1t°
The apportionment, and in earlier cases the denial, of compensation gen-
erally reflects an analysis of relative causation. 01 There are cases, how-
ever, in which the compensation appears to be apportioned on the basis
of relative "blameworthiness" in a broad, moral sense. Thus, Whiteman
96. Earnshaw & Others Case (Zafiro Case) (U.K. v. U.S.), 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 160,
164-65 (1925).
97. Martini Case (Italy v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 644, 666-68 (1930); accord
Petrocelli Case (Italy v. Venez.), 10 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 591, 592 (1903).
98. Corfu Channel Case (Merits) (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 95 (Azevedo, J.,
dissenting).
99. See I M. WHITEMAN, supra note 18, at 217; see also B. BOLLECKER-STERN, supra
note 5, at 341-42 (arguing that if injury is caused by the combination of the conduct of the
injured victim and another state, there is no liability).
100. See J. PERSONNAZ, supra note 48, at 107; 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 48,
at 662-63; de Ar~ehaga, supra note 5, § 9.19, at 569; Garcia-Amador, supra note 58, at 44.
In municipal practice, the dominant trend is toward comparative apportionment. See J.
HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 456, 461,466 (3d ed. 1977);
1 F. LAWSON & B. MARKESINIS, ToRTious LIABILITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL HARM IN THE
COMMON LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW 131-34 (1982); G. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, § 63, at
256-59; SALMOND AND HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORT § 197 (R. Heuston & R. Chambers
18th ed. 1981); PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 12, § 67, at 471. As in the
context of inter se contribution among wrongdoers, see infra note 135, municipal practice as to
the basis upon which comparative fault is to be determined--causation versus blameworthi-
ness-remains inconsistent. See Weir, Complex Liabilities, 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, pt. 2, ch. 12, § 86 (A. Tunc ed. 1983).
101. See, e.g., B. BOLLECKER-STERN, supra note 5, at 317-44; 1 M. WHITEMAN, supra
note 18, at 216-22.
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notes that compensation in arrest, detention, and imprisonment cases is
"influenced considerably by the conduct of the claimant. ' 10 2 In the
Garcia and Garza case, for example, the measure of compensation
awarded for the unjustified shooting by U.S. officials of a Mexican na-
tional illegally crossing the border was expressly reduced due to the
knowingly wrongful character of the victim's conduct.10 3 Similarly, the
"imprudent" conduct of Americans' firing into the air for fun led the
Kling case tribunal to mitigate the damages otherwise payable for the
wrongful shooting of one of the Americans by Mexican troops. 1°4 Such
recourse to relative blame appears consistent with the undisputed sub-
mission of Great Britain in the 1872 Alabama Claims arbitration (U.S. v.
U.K.) "that the arbitrators should.., take into account not only the loss
incurred but the greater or less gravity of the default itself."105 In sum-
mary, as Schwarzenberger states, "In establishing the amount of com-
pensation, international judicial institutions admit more freely than in
discharging other functions of a similar kind the equitable character of
their jurisdiction."10 6 Tribunals deciding international cases possess the
discretion, capacity, and relevant experience to allocate the burden of
compensation among multiple responsible states.
IV. Joint and Several Liability: Municipal Practice
A. The Relevance of Municipal Practice
An analysis of the response of municipal legal systems to multiple
party responsibility for harm occasioned by wrongful conduct can assist
in the identification and development of international rules to govern the
consequences of multiple state responsibility. To the extent that munici-
pal rules exhibit characteristics of "general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations," they may serve as a source of international law.107
Cheng states that general principles of law are not "specific rules formu-
lated for practical purposes, but.., general propositions underlying the
various rules of law which express the essential qualities of juridical truth
itself."' 0 8 If a rule of joint and several liability does not constitute a
102. 1 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 18, at 375.
103. Garcia & Garza Case (Mex. v.'U.S.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 119, 123 (1926).
104. Kling Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 575, 585 (1930) (Alfaro, Arb.,
concurring).
105. 1 J. MOORE, HiSTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO
WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 623 (1898).
106. 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 48, at 661 (footnote omitted).
107. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(I)(c), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060; see
Mosler, General Principles of Law, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 89
(1984); cf C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83-91 (1965).
108. B. CHENG, supra note 48, at 24.
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"general proposition" rising to the level of a general principle, it never-
theless may constitute a component or subsidiary rule of the accepted
general principle of law recognizing full reparation for injury. 10 9
Even if municipal legal rules are not general principles of law, such
rules may provide analogies useful for the progressive development of
international law.110 According to de Visscher, the process of using mu-
nicipal law to develop or elucidate international law "is never a pure and
simple transfer of elements of municipal law into international law," but
instead involves "identifying in their convergence a principle derived
from common social necessity." '111 Consequently, "what is decisive is
not the external similarity of the institutions or rules that are being com-
pared... [but] rather the underlying principle that is common to them
and explains them." 112 International and municipal law appear to share
such identical underlying principles in the area of allocating compensa-
tion obligations: to make the injured party whole through pecuniary
compensation for loss, and to channel the cost or burden of the injury to
its author in order to deter repetition." 3
Two additional factors may make municipal analogies particularly rel-
evant to an analysis of multiple state responsibility. First, municipal law
on the subject of multiple party liability has been developed in the private
law context. As Lauterpacht observes, municipal private law belongs to
the same "genus" as international public law: each "regulates the rela-
tions of legal entities in a state of co-ordination," as distinct from that of
subordination.' 4 Reference to municipal systems, as a source of either
general principles of law or relevant analogies, may therefore prove espe-
cially helpful in evaluating the consequences in international law of mul-
tiple state responsibility.' 1 5 Second, international law and literature
reveal the absence of a significant body of state practice or established
principles concerning the consequences of multiple state responsibility.
109. Id. at 233-40; see supra text accompanying note 48
110. See F. VALI, SERVITUDES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY OF FOREIGN TERRI-
TORY 51 (2d ed. 1958).
111. C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 400 (P.
Corbett trans. rev. ed. 1968).
112. Id.
113. See supra text accompanying note 48; infra text accompanying notes 138-39.
114. H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 34, at 81 (1927).
115. See H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMU-
NITY 66, 77-79 (1933). But see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 456 (stating that municipal
analogies are "unhelpful" in the context of multiple responsibility). See also Gray, supra note
48, at 46-47 (suggesting that it may not be possible "to evolve a set of general rules [about
remedies] applicable in all cases and specific enough to give guidance" and that recourse either




Joint and Several State Liability
When addressing the issue of the consequences of multiple state responsi-
bility, recourse to municipal law would, therefore, not threaten any es-
tablished international norm.
B. Content of Municipal Rules
At the most basic level, all municipal systems approach multiple party
responsibility as a juridical fact and possess substantive and procedural
regimes designed specifically to manage such situations. 116 The issue of
the consequences of multiple responsibility is a subset of the more gen-
eral problem of concurrent claims. This article focuses on the municipal
law of concurrent claims in which a victim has claims against two or
more different responsible persons, rather than on the situation in which
a victim has or may have two or more claims for compensation against
the same person.117
The treatment of multiple responsibility in municipal systems is re-
markably consistent. As Weir states,
It is the very general rule that if a tortfeasor's behavior is held to be a cause
of the victim's harm, the tortfeasor is liable to pay for all of the harm so
caused, notwithstanding that there was a concurrent cause of that harm and
that another is responsible for that cause.118
This rule is firmly established with respect to wrongdoers engaged in
concerted conduct. Joint tortfeasors are, in both the common and civil
law tradition, uniformly held to be jointly and severally liable; a claim
may be made for the entire amount of compensation due the injured
party against any or all of the joint participants in an injurious act.'19
The same general rule of joint and several liability applies to wrongdo-
ers acting independently with respect to a single event. If the harm occa-
sioned by the conduct of an independent wrongdoer may be separately
identified, the measure of each wrongdoer's responsibility will be limited
to compensation for the specific harm caused. If, however, the injury is
116. See P. JAMES & D. BROWN, supra note 12, at 23-24, 349-73; PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS, supra note 12, §§ 46-52; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 12; Weir, supra note 100, §§ 79-
104.
117. See Weir, supra note 100, §§ 1, 79-104.
118. Id. § 79. One can compare tort law with those portions of contract law that involve
claims for compensation. Weir notes that references to "tortfeasors" generally "include those
liable for breaches of contract." Id. § 78. Commentators have identified four traditional cir-
cumstances of joint and several liability in U.S. tort law. These include cases of concerted
conduct, cases involving independent wrongdoers producing an indivisible injury, situations in
which multiple parties failed to perform a common duty owed to the plaintiff, and situations in
which a master has been found vicariously liable along with the master's agent. Note, Recent
Developments in Joint & Several Liability, 24 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1319, 1319-25 (1973).
119. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON ToRTs, supra note 12, § 46; G. WILLIAMS, supra note
12, § 2; Weir, supra note 100, § 84.
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not so divisible, both common and civil law systems deem the
contributing independent tortfeasors severally liable to the injured party
for the entire amount of compensation due. 120 Prosser and Keeton
summarize:
Where a factual basis can be found for some rough practical apportion-
ment, which limits a defendant's liability to that part of the harm of which
that defendant has been a cause in fact, it is likely that the apportionment
will be made. Where no such basis can be found, the courts generally hold
the defendant for the entire loss, notwithstanding the fact that other causes
have contributed to it.121
Joint and several liability is also the general rule in cases of indivisible
harm, even if the actions of one defendant acting alone would not have
caused the entire harm.122
Non-Western legal systems also accept joint and several liability. The
Soviet Union, for example, accepts the principle of joint and several lia-
bility in order to compensate victims and to deter future tortious conduct
by exerting an "educational influence on the violator."' 123 Article 455 of
the 1984 revision of the Soviet Civil Code states, "Persons who jointly
cause harm shall bear joint liability to the victim."' 124 Under Soviet law,
joint causation exists where the "loss is the inseparable result of the ac-
tions of two or more persons," and "it is not necessary to show that the
persons conspired to perform the wrongful act or that each person knew
of the other's act or even that their acts were performed at the same
time."'125 In one early case, for example, the owner of an enterprise and
his contractor each violated safety rules that resulted in injury to a
120. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, §§ 1-2; ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD [Tortious Acts]
§§ 312-313 (1982) (Dutch law); Weir, supra note 100, § 79 (citing commentators, along with
statutes and cases, from Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Po-
land, Saskatchewan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).
121. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 12, § 52; accord Weir, supra note 100,
§ 83.
122. See Weir, supra note 100, § 85. But see 1 CIVIL CODE 394-95 (H. Emami ed. 1959)
(under Shi'ite Islamic law, an injured party can recover only a proportion of his damages from
each of multiple tortfeasors if the actions of each tortfeasor were not a sufficient cause of the
entire harm).
123. Krasavchikov, Concept of the Obligation to Compensate Harm, in 2 SOVETSKOE
GRAZHDANSKOE PRAVO 363 (0. Krasavchikov ed. 1969), quoted in J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER
& P. MAGGS, supra note 100, at 441, 442.
124. Quoted in J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, supra note 100, at 441. Joint and
several liability also existed under article 455's predecessor-article 408 of the Civil Code.
125. E. FLEISHrrS & 0. IOFFE, KOMMENTARII K GRAZDANSKOMY KODEKSY R.S.F.S.R.
[Commentary on the Civil Code of the R.S.F.S.R.] 678-79 (2d rev. ed. 1970), translated in
Osakwe, An Examination of the Modern Soviet Law of Torts, 54 TUL. L. REV. 1, 61 (1979); see
also Protocol No. 2 of the Conference of the Members of the GKK, Feb. 4, 1927 [Svdebnaia
Praktika (Court Practice) 1927 No. 7, p. 21], quoted in Holman & Spinner, Bases of Liability
for Tortious Injury in Soviet Law, 22 IOWA L. REV. 1, 28 (1936).
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worker; the owner and contractor were found jointly and severally
liable.126 Although social insurance and public health legislation cur-
rently protect accident victims in the Soviet Union, tort law remains im-
portant in two circumstances. First, a "still significant portion of the
population" is not fully covered by social insurance, and such individuals
can recover for personal injuries under general tort law provisions.12 7
Second, the social insurance agency that pays benefits may sue the
tortfeasor for recoupment of its payments as the subrogee of the rights of
the victim.128
The Shi'ite branch of Islamic law also recognizes joint and several lia-
bility to further the goal of victim compensation. The basic rules regard-
ing responsibility and liability in tort derive from the tradition of
Mohammed, who said, "There can be no loss or harm without compen-
sation."129 Thus, one causing harm or loss must compensate the vic-
tim. 130 In cases of joint responsibility, the Shi'ite branch of Islamic law
holds each tortfeasor liable only for his respective portion of the damage
if his acts could not have caused the entire harm. Joint and several liabil-
ity, however, is the rule when a plaintiff's harm is caused by the acts of
two tortfeasors, either one of which alone would be sufficient to produce
the harm. In such a case, the plaintiff can sue one of the tortfeasors for
the entire amount of damages.' 3 '
Municipal law exceptions to the general rule of joint and several liabil-
ity are few. Admiralty law has not completely accepted joint and several
liability. Following the lead suggested by the Brussels Collision Liability
Convention of 1910,132 virtually all leading maritime states apportion the
original liability for property damage suffered by an injured party on the
126. Ezhenedel'nik Sovetskoy Iustitsii (The Soviet Law Weekly) 1926 No. 20, quoted in
Holman & Spinner, supra note 125, at 30-31; see I V. GSOVSKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 530
(1948).
127. J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, supra note 100, at 437.
128. Id. at 438. For discussion of Soviet tort law, see generally Minan & Morris, Unrav-
eling an Enigma: An Introduction to Soviet Law and the Soviet Legal System, 19 GEo. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & EcON. 1, 28-31 (1985); Osakwe, supra note 125.
129. "La Zarara va la Zerara fi al Islam" (translated by Ali Moslehi), discussed in M.
ANSSARI, BOOK OF SALES 246-50 (1973).
130. Two specific principles in Shi'ite law are the "Etlof," under which a tortfeasor is
liaole for all harm resulting directly from his conduct, and the "Tashbib," under which a
tortfeasor is liable for injury or damage resulting from his indirect action only when he is at
fault. For a discussion of the concepts of "Tashib" and "Etlof," see M. AL-HILLI, SHARA'I
AL-ISLAM 387 (1955).
131. 1 CIVIL CODE, supra note 122, at 394; conversation with Ali Moslehi, former Dean
and Professor, National University of Tehran Law School (Oct. 21, 1987).
132. Conventions pour l'unification de certaines r6gles en mati~re d'abordage et en mati~re
d'assistance et de sauvetage maritimes, Sept. 23, 1910, art. 4, 7 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL
(ser. 3) 711, 719.
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basis of comparative fault. 133 Even in admiralty, however, joint and sev-
eral liability is the established practice for personal injuries or death. 134
In addition, the United States and the United Kingdom, two of the major
maritime states, apply joint and several liability to claims by innocent
third parties for damage to cargoes1 35 or vessels.136 Other exceptions to
the joint and several liability rule have been minor and extremely uncom-
mon: partial liability exists, for example, in British Columbia in highway
collision cases brought by a guest passenger, in Switzerland in cases
where the guardian of a vehicle is strictly liable, and in Colombia in cases
brought against owners of a house that collapses. 137
The theoretical justifications for the general rule of joint and several
liability in cases of indivisible harm are straightforward. The primary
justification is the general tort law policy of affording "the victim of the
harm the maximum possible chance of having his harm properly and
fully compensated." 138 The importance of compensation, in turn, de-
pends primarily on the objective of indemnification of the loss suffered.
Compensation may also achieve secondary functions, including "punish-
ment of the wrongdoer, satisfaction for the injured party, declaration of
violated rights, deterrence and prevention of enrichment," but such func-
tions are usually just "incidental by-products of indemnification."'' 39 A
133. The Brussels Convention rule of no joint and several liability for damage to cargo
passed narrowly and has been attributed to a "peculiar accident" of English law. The "acci-
dent" was The "Milan," 167 Eng. Rep. 167 (1861), a much criticized decision which held that
despite the prevailing rule of joint and several liability, an innocent cargo could recover only
half of its damages from the noncarrier in a both-to-blame collision. See Owen, The Origins
and Development of Marine Collision Law, 51 TuL. L. REv. 759, 770-71, 797-98 (1977).
The United States, which is not a party to the Brussels Convention, applied a rule of equal
division of damages in cases involving harm to vessels until 1975, when it adopted the ap-
proach of apportionment according to comparative fault. See United States v. Reliable Trans-
fer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975); Recent Decision Comment, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 202 (1975)
(authored by John E. Noyes).
134. Weir, supra note 100, § 82.
135. See Aktieselskabet Cuzco v. The Sucarseco, 294 U.S. 394 (1935) (innocent cargo
owners seeking general average contributions); The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540, 542, 549-52
(1899) (innocent cargo owners seeking damages for physical injury); The "Atlas.," 93 U.S. 302
(1876) (cargo on innocent third vessel; in rem proceeding against one of two at-fault vessels).
136. See The "Alabama" & The "Game-cock.," 92 U.S. 695 (1875) (claim by innocent
third vessel; decree against two at-fault vessels is for one-half damages each, but libellant can
obtain amounts uncollectable from one vessel from the other); The Cairnbahn, [1914] P. 25
(C.A.) (claim by innocent third vessel); G. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, § 8 (noting a lacuna in
U.K. legislation that implements the Brussels Convention, Maritime Conventions Act, 1911, 1
& 2 Geo. 5, ch. 57, § 1, which applies apportionment to third-party claims for cargo damage
but allows joint and several liability for claims for damage to innocent vessels or to cargo on
board such vessels); Owen, supra note 133, at 804-06.
137. See Weir, supra note 100, § 82.
138. 1 F. LAWSON & B. MARKESINIS, supra note 100, at 126; accord Weir, supra note 100,
§ 79.
139. Stoll, Consequences of Liability: Remedies, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF COMPARATIVE LAW, pt. 2, ch. 8, § 135 (A. Tunc ed. 1983).
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related and often raised statement of the indemnification justification for
joint and several liability is the desire to protect the victim from the pos-
sible insolvency of one tortfeasor or from the unavailability of one
tortfeasor on jurisdictional grounds.140 Some have criticized the general
joint and several liability rule, arguing that a system of partial liability of
tortfeasors more fairly weighs and balances the various contributions of
multiple tortfeasors to an injury. 141 Certainly, as with property damage
in admiralty, apportionment could precede compensation; each wrong-
doer could be deemed liable to the injured party only to the extent of its
ultimate, post-contribution liability under the existing system. 142 Because
the system of partial liability would undercut the victim's compensation
interests, the world's legal systems have not incorporated it. The victim,
Weir states,
would be required, in order to obtain full compensation, to sue all those
responsible for every cause of the harm, even when the legislator has made
one of them strictly liable.
... To require the victim to sue all those possibly liable is to go too far,
especially if only one of them, by being criminally or strictly liable, offers
the victim facilities of procedure or proof.143
But does the rule of joint and several liability in municipal legal sys-
tems depend upon the availability of a system of contribution, whereby
defendants ultimately may adjust their liability among themselves ac-
cording to relative degrees of fault or causal contribution to the injury?'"
Since contribution claims depend on principles of prevention of unjust
enrichment, 45 there appears to be no necessary unity between the com-
pensatory function of tort law and the function of contribution. Further-
more, under common law, a joint tortfeasor burdened with the full claim
140. See Weir, supra note 100, § 79. Historical reasons that may have contributed to the
acceptance of joint and several liability at common law appear less central than the compensa-
tion/indemnification justification. See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L.
REV. 413, 418 (1935) (noting that common law concept of unity of cause of action prevented
jury from apportioning damages, and noting the perception that division of damages was
impossible).
141. See Weir, supra note 100, § 80.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
143. Weir, supra note 100, § 81.
144. The basis of the apportionment among wrongdoers in the contribution context is dis-
puted. Two interpretations have been advocated. Some argue that the share of responsibility
should be determined on the basis of relative causation, while others advocate spreading re-
sponsibility based on blameworthiness (i.e., fault in its broadest sense). See generally W. ROG-
ERS, supra note 12, at 608; SALMOND AND HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 100,
§ 168; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, § 44, at 157; Weir, supra note 100, § 132. "The normal
approach is to take into account both fault and causation." Id.
145. Weir, supra note 100, § 106.
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possessed no right to seek contribution from its fellow wrongdoers. 146
Nevertheless, the availability of contribution does make a system of joint
and several liability more palatable, and apparently helps to obviate the
need for doctrines that would exculpate defendants who are only slightly
at fault from liability to an injured plaintiff.147
No particular scheme of contribution appears necessary for the vitality
of joint and several liability in municipal legal systems. Although some
form of contribution or indemnity is available in all legal systems, 148 the
conditions to its availability vary significantly. For example, in different
legal systems, contribution may derive from wide-ranging sources, in-
cluding subrogation, independent right, or statutory terms. In some sys-
tems, contribution may not be available unless a claim has formally been
reduced to judgment, or unless all the joint tortfeasors have been named
in the complaint or the judgment. In addition, the amount or availability
of contribution varies among legal systems when one tortfeasor has set-
tled with the plaintiff. 149
Theoretical criticisms of the doctrine of contribution may have con-
tributed to the absence of uniformity among different municipal legal sys-
tems' regimes of contribution. Proponents of an economic analysis of
law, who advocate the development of tort rules that minimize the sum
of accident, accident avoidance, and administrative costs, have criticized
contribution on two grounds: first, that "there is no evidence that contri-
bution is a more efficient rule than no contribution," and, second, that a
rule allowing contribution from joint tortfeasors when they are not
named in the complaint or judgment "is almost certainly less efficient
than no contribution."1 50 Others have argued that the strict liability goal
of imposing liability on enterprises or institutions best able to "spread the
loss" is undercut when an institutional defendant, initially sued alone
and jointly and severally liable to an injured victim, can recover contri-
bution from individual tortfeasors who are not good loss spreaders.151
146. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 12, § 50.
147. See, eg., Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1735, 1798-99 (1985).
148. "In all systems of law there are some circumstances in which a person who has satis-
fied a victim's claim may recoup himself from another party who was liable for the same harm
and who has been liberated from liability by the payment made." Weir, supra note 100, § 105.
149. See, eg., Weir, supra note 100, §§ 109-140.
150. Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 517, 550 (1980).
151. See James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV.
L. REV. 1156 (1941); Weir, supra note 100, § 107. For discussion of various possible meanings
of "spreading the loss," see G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS 21 (1970).
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A few recent developments have led to criticisms of the use of joint
and several liability in particular situations. For example, Epstein argues
that joint and several liability should not be used in complex mass tort
cases in which only one of many defendants in fact caused the harm
suffered by an individual plaintiff.1 52 In such cases a rule of joint and
several liability may insufficiently "marry the demand for administrative
simplicity with the need to create the right set of incentives upon all ac-
tors for controlling harm."1 53 A rule that limits the liability of joint
tortfeasors to a proportionate share of the harm, Epstein argues, could
help
minimize the sum of... (1) the administrative costs of the rule, and (2) the
error costs of the rule, that is the costs of holding someone liable for harms
not done, or not holding someone liable for harms he did do, within the
substantive constraints imposed by general product liability law.1 54
In addition, a few recent "tort reform" statutes in the United States have
limited the joint and several liability exposure of defendants in particular
fact situations or for noneconomic injury.155 Such statutes typically have
responded to the concern that cities or small businesses may be liable for
high damages when they are only slightly at fault and are sued jointly
with insolvent individual defendants from whom contribution cannot be
obtained. 156
None of the criticisms just mentioned is likely to affect the use of joint
and several liability in international law. Examples of multiple state re-
sponsibility most likely will arise when only a few states have injured
another state; mass tort claims against multiple defendants are the prod-
ucts of complex domestic societies with complex legal procedures. Fur-
thermore, cases of multiple state responsibility are likely to involve
situations in which responsible and identifiable states each have injured
another state.157 Finally, the need to limit joint and several liability be-
cause of the perception that a responsible state cannot (as opposed to
152. Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEO. LJ. 1377 (1985).
153. Id. at 1378.
154. Id. at 1379. Much of Epstein's argument also relates to the approach in several mass
tort alternative liability cases that allows individual defendants to introduce exculpatory evi-
dence. "The administrative costs of a market share rule with exculpation are greater than the
costs of the same rule without exculpation. Similarly, the error rate will be higher when excul-
pation is allowed than with the pure market share rule." Id. at 1381-82.
155. See, eg., Fair Responsibility Act of 1986, § 3, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West
Supp. 1986); D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 1-2 (5th ed. Supp. 1988).
156. See, eg., Russell v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 810, 819-20, 230 Cal. Rptr. 102,
108 (1986).
157. Claims against a set of state actors for damage of indeterminate origin are plausible,
however, in the context of international environmental harm.
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being unwilling to) pay compensation appears unlikely. To say that cer-
tain objections to a rule of joint and several liability in municipal law will
not apply in international law, however, is far different from saying that
the presence of such a rule in municipal practice supports the existence of
a similar rule in international law. The next section explores the pros-
pect of formulating a progressive regime of international law based on
the fragments of state practice that do exist, general principles of law,
and municipal analogies.
V. A Progressive Regime
A. A Prefatory Note
The international rules of compensation for multiple state responsibil-
ity are not yet mature. Nonetheless, on the basis of the available interna-
tional and municipal literature and precedent, one can suggest both the
logical contours of such rules and the circumstances in which a progres-
sive regime is most likely to achieve consensus among states. It is impor-
tant to note in preface, however, two distinct characteristics of the
international system-each a corollary of the principles of equality and
independence of states-that will affect an analysis of the utility of any
municipal analogy, particularly the municipal analogy of joint and sev-
eral liability.
First, dispute settlement in the international system depends on the
will of the states involved. There is no truly compulsory method to ob-
tain a resolution or judgment regarding a claim of responsibility. 158 Even
the putative "compulsory jurisdiction" of the International Court of Jus-
tice operates only when states have affirmatively expressed their consent
to the Court's jurisdiction, often coupling such consent with reservations
and conditions that severely limit the effective scope of the compulsory
jurisdiction. 159 The absence of a mandatory process of dispute settlement
can affect both injured and breaching states in the multiple responsibility
context. The former may find no state or only one state-because of
either prior consent to judicial process or simply moral, political, or eco-
nomic susceptibility-responsive to a claim for compensation. A wrong-
doer similarly may find no fellow wrongdoer willing or obligated to
entertain a claim for contribution. Such disabilities, unique to the inter-
national plane, temper any instinct to adopt municipal principles in a
wholesale fashion.
158. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 705.
159. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 354-61 (H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963); 1 S.
ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 364-421 (1961).
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The second characteristic, somewhat more abstract, relates to the lack
of legislative authority in the international legal system. Joint and sev-
eral liability reflects a municipal policy decision to protect the injured
party by imposing upon each wrongdoer an obligation to pay compensa-
tion for the entire injury, even for that share of the harm ultimately de-
fined as the responsibility of another party. Nothing inherent in
international society would preclude a parallel system. The international
community, however, lacks a legislative authority to make such global
policy decisions or to dictate rules designed for the collective good. In-
ternational law remains the product of common perceptions of private
good. 160 A principal impediment to the development of effective interna-
tional law is that states continue to equate any diminution of the preroga-
tives of "independence" with private detriment. 161 An international rule
of joint and several liability, by imposing on one state a measure of liabil-
ity conceptually attributable to another state, certainly would encroach
on such independence. This fact impugns neither the logic nor the pro-
priety of joint and several liability, however, since all of international law
encroaches on independence. In postulating a rule of joint and several
liability, one must simply respect the force of and justify qualifications to
the notion of independence.
B. Contours of the Regime
Despite the foregoing cautions, joint and several liability, as evident in
municipal systems and reflected in international convention, represents
an appropriate rule for the international system when states are engaged
in a wrongful common enterprise. The objections to burdening one state
with the entire measure of due compensation in the context of a con-
certed action do not outweigh the objective of providing injured states
with the greatest opportunity to achieve compensation. Considerations
of state "independence" are mitigated in this circumstance; participation
in an enterprise to achieve a common benefit renders the correlative costs
or consequences of the enterprise common to all wrongdoer participants
vis-a-vis an injured state. Moreover, if a regime involving joint and sev-
eral liability were clearly established, states would expect and implicitly
consent to the attendant risks and burdens by entry into the concerted
160. Lasswell argues that the privatism that now dominates the international community
will give way to a collective orientation as states increasingly perceive shared values, risks, and
characteristics. See Lasswell, Future Systems of Identity in the World Community, in 4 THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 3, 26 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1972).
161. For excellent discussions of the importance and role of the principle of sovereign
independence, see C. DE VISSCHER, supra note 11I, at 89-106; A. LARSON & C. JENKS, SOV-
EREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW 1-28, 433-71 (1965).
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activity. The notion of independence at most suggests the propriety of a
right of contribution; each state should ultimately bear only the conse-
quences of its share of the common enterprise. States participating in a
common activity have the opportunity to establish a mechanism for
"compulsory" dispute settlement through prior inter se agreements, 162
and they can establish specific contribution or indemnity obligations rep-
resenting their own views of the appropriate allocation of risk. 163 The
right to contribution finds support, in any event, in the underlying policy
objective of deterrence through channeling costs to the responsible states
and in general considerations of fairness and avoidance of unjust
enrichment. 164
These factors supporting joint and several liability for participants in
common enterprises do not apply when independent actors produce a
single harm. By definition, such independent wrongdoers have neither
the prior opportunity to establish substantive or procedural rights with
respect to the sharing of liability nor the communal benefits and expecta-
tions present in the situation of concerted conduct.1 65 The relationship
of independent wrongdoers is established only by and upon the event of
the injury; no pre-existing or even expected linkage exists between the
states' conduct. To impose joint and several liability on independent
wrongdoers (as is done on the municipal plane), therefore, would require
a policy decision that the objectives of securing adequate compensation
for injured states outweighs the breaching state's uncertainty of contribu-
tion and qualified independence.
If one is persuaded that imposing joint and several liability on in-
dependent wrongdoers is unacceptable, municipal admiralty practice in
cases of damage to property suggests an alternative to joint and several
liability in these circumstances. 166 Following the admiralty model, the
obligations of each state to compensate the injured state would be limited
162. For discussion of jurisdiction of a judicial institution based upon an agreement pre-
ceding the particular dispute, see Ambatielos Case (Preliminary Objection) (Greece v. U.K.),
1952 I.C.J. 28; 1 S. ROSENNE, supra note 159, at 332-35.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 80, 87; infra note 177 and accompanying text
(discussion of Space Objects Convention).
164. See Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of International
Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1189, 1253-54 (1965).
165. The situation of complicity may represent an exception, suggesting that for these pur-
poses complicity perhaps should be treated as a circumstance of "concerted" activity. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 118, at 1319-25.
An exception, of course, exists when states may anticipate injury arising out of the conjunc-
tion of certain independent acts-for example, the placement and operation of space objects-
and reach agreement as to the sharing of liability and rights of indemnity. See supra text
accompanying notes 85-87. In such cases, the same logic applicable to concerted conduct
supports the imposition of joint and several liability.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 132-36.
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to a proportional share based on fault. This approach has two obvious
merits: it avoids the perils of the contribution process, 167 and it satisfies
even expansive notions of independence by limiting each state's liability
to a share of the harm for which it alone is deemed responsible.
Despite such advantages, a serious inequity arises if an "apportioned
liability" approach is adopted to protect the interests of breaching states
that have acted independently. The central question is who is to bear the
risk of loss arising out of injury: the injured state (through a denial of
compensation) or the members of the set of wrongdoers (through lack of
contribution)? On both the municipal and international planes the mani-
fest concerns with assuring adequate compensation for injuries combine
with concerns of deterrence and corrective justice to suggest that, as be-
tween an injured party and any wrongdoer, the burden of loss should fall
upon the latter. Hence, a regime of joirit and several liability, coupled
with a right of contribution, should also be adopted .with respect to in-
dependent wrongdoers producing a single harm.
Whether allocation of proportional liability among multiple responsi-
ble states is made part of a process of contribution or an aspect of a
regime of "apportioned liability," one may identify the probable charac-
ter of such allocation procedures. As in international practice with re-
spect to contributory conduct, 168 apportionment would likely be
premised upon causation, blameworthiness, or both, depending upon the
facts of the specific case. A number of factors or guidelines inevitably
will affect any such apportionment. The character of each state's intent
in breaching its international obligation, for example, would affect the
decisionmaker's attribution of degrees of fault. Thus, specific intent to
cause a wrong would likely be treated more harshly than negligence.
Among states engaged in concerted wrongful conduct, the apportion-
ment decision would reflect the character of each state's financial partici-
pation, decisionmaking authority, and expected benefit in the
enterprise. 169 In addition, in many cases of independent wrongdoers, the
measure of each state's legal authority or jurisdiction over the injury-
producing conduct-often a shorthand definition of its effective control
of an event-will be of paramount importance in apportioning degrees of
fault. The inquiry into legal authority and control is perhaps best viewed
as an expression of the criterion of causality: the state with the greater
167. See supra text accompanying notes 149-5 1. These perils are exacerbated by the proce-
dural limitations in dispute settlement among states.
168. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
169. See Goldie, supra note 164, at 1254; see also Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United
States, 127 F. Supp. at 554 (quoted supra at text accompanying note 72).
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measure of jurisdiction to control conduct is deemed to possess a greater
causal connection to the consequences of such conduct. 170 In addition,
such apportionment on the basis of authority to control contributes to
deterrence by imposing the burden of compensation in proportion to the
relative capacities of the states to prevent repetition of the injurious
event. Similarly, a state actor would be attributed a greater degree of
fault than a state whose responsibility arises out of its failure to prevent
the state actor from inflicting the injury. In a situation in which a state
organ authors the conduct that directly inflicts injury, as opposed to one
in which a state is responsible for a failure of due diligence, a mere exer-
cise of self-control would suffice to prevent the injury. 171 In sum, princi-
ples of causation and relative fault likely will shape either a regime of
several liability or a regime of contribution following joint and several
liability. 172
C. The Development and Implementation of a Rule of Joint and
Several Liability
Several features of international legal process suggest scenarios in
which an international regime of joint and several liability is most likely
to be recognized, developed, and implemented in international practice.
First, joint and several liability is most likely to be accepted when the
action of any one of the breaching states would have caused the harm
suffered, and when the fault of the breaching states appears approxi-
mately equal. Fixing each state with the entire original compensation
obligation presents the least difficulty in situations in which the acts of
any one of the independent wrongdoers would have been sufficient to
cause the entire harm. 173 Problems of policy are far greater when harm
170. See generally C. EAGLETON, supra note 7, §§ 2, 6; M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNA-
TIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILE ACTS OF PRIVATE PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN
STATES 29 (1962); 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND AP-
PLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 217D (2d ed. 1945); 2 id. § 285A; Friedmann, The Growth of
State Control Over the Individual, and Its Effect Upon the Rules of International State Respon-
sibility, 19 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 118 (1938); Handl, State Liability for Accidental Transnational
Environmental Damage by Private Persons, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 525, 531-35 (1980); Lenoble,
Responsabilitd Internationale des Etats et Controle Territorial, 16 REV. BELGE DE DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL 95 (1981-1982).
171. Perhaps the clearest illustration is, again, the circumstance of an attack by state A on
a diplomatic mission in state B, accomplished because state B failed to exercise due diligence.
See supra text accompanying notes 15-17. As between the two responsible states, state A
would be assigned the greater degree of fault.
172. The possible alternative of apportionment on a pro rata basis could lead to the unjust
enrichment of a responsible state, could fail to channel costs to the state best able to prevent
repetition of injurious conduct, and could impinge on the independence of a state that pays
more than its equitable share of compensation.
173. See, eg., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 12, § 52.
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is the consequence only of the combination of conduct essentially
equivalent in terms of causation and blameworthiness. 174 Most troubling
are situations in which joint and several liability would result in placing
total liability on a state with a relatively minor degree of responsibility
whose actions were not alone sufficient to cause the harm-particularly if
the state lacks any effective means to obtain contribution. 75 When a
state is only slightly at fault, therefore, concerns of fairness and existing
state practice suggest application of a de minimis rule: only the state or
states materially at fault would be deemed responsible, and issues of joint
and several liability and contribution would not arise with respect to the
excluded state.176
Furthermore, the availability of contribution, whether by agreement of
the responsible state or by adoption of the practice in tribunals that look
to municipal analogies, seems essential to a regime of joint and several
liability to protect concerns of state independence. The Space Objects
Convention, for example, adopted contribution based on comparative
fault both in cases of concerted and independent conduct. Provision for
contribution apparently was essential for acceptance of the principle of
joint and several liability in the Convention.177 The implementation of
contribution in international practice would require decisioihmakers to
174. Consider the case of two acts of pollution, harmless in themselves, that combine
through predictable chemical processes to cause damage. See id. Rest views joint and several
liability as appropriate in this situation if the originators were aware of each other's contribu-
tions or deliberately caused the injurious result, or if the activities were ultrahazardous. Rest
considers joint and several liability more problematic, however, where damage results from the
"accidental" accumulation of nonultrahazardous independent single actions. See A. REST,
CONVENTION ON COMPENSATION FOR TRANSFRONTIER ENVIRONMENTAL INJURIES (DRAFT
WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES) 47-50 (1976).
175. For example, the Space Objects Convention does not make subject to joint and several
liability minor contributors to the launch of a space vehicle that subsequently causes damage.
See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., REPORT ON CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY
SPACE OBJECTS, ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND DATA 29 (Comm. Print 1972). In some other
conventions liability is placed on a single readily identifiable party deemed capable of having
avoided the damage; states found to have only a slight connection to damage escape findings of
responsibility altogether. Article XVIII of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nu-
clear Damage, opened for signature, May 21, 1963, reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 727, 742 (1963), and
article II of the Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25,
1962, reprinted in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 269 (1963) (not yet in force), for example, impose
liability first upon the operators of nuclear installations and vessels, respectively. If the opera-
tors' payments are deficient, the licensing states must indemnify victims for a shortfall. No
joint liability is imposed on the manufacturer or supplier of a nuclear ship or installation,
perhaps because it is easier to identify operators and because the involvement of a state in
which a nuclear ship or installation is manufactured is considered minimal compared to the
involvement of the operator. See Malik, supra note 81, at 350.
176. See Handl, supra note 170, at 534-35; supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
177. Space Objects Convention, supra note 44, art. IV(2); see supra notes 77-87 and ac-
companying text; see also Interim Agreement Between Australia, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the European Organisation for the Development and
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grapple with the difficult problem of the apportionment of compensation
liability. As in municipal practice, the attribution of degrees of responsi-
bility among states could rarely be accomplished with mathematical pre-
cision. 178 Yet, international decisions with respect to the impact of the
contributory conduct of injured parties, force majeure, or non-state ac-
tors show that international tribunals possess the experience and capacity
to make determinations of relative responsibility. 179
Because indemnification for loss is the fundamental reason behind the
principle of joint and several liability,18 0 the principle is most likely to be
recognized where states perceive and accept a special need or demand for
compensation of injured parties. The Space Objects Convention again
provides an example. In discussing why the Convention adopted provi-
sions favorable to victims such as absolute liability for injuries caused by
space objects, Matte notes a particular need for effective compensation:
[T]he potential victim's position is very unfavourable; his knowledge of the
techniques involved and his control over the space activity is minimal, he
cannot foresee the risks and, therefore, does not know how or to what ex-
tent to protect himself. It is only fair to translate this inequality of positions
into a regime which places the burden of the loss on the stronger party, the
launching State.18 1
The same concern for the victim state prompted adoption of the rule of
joint and several liability for launching states.182
In addition, a state might find joint and several liability most accepta-
ble in circumstances in which the state need not admit that it has en-
gaged in wrongful or, worse, morally blameworthy conduct.183 The
reluctance of states to admit wrongdoing so often seen in the diplomatic
context may be increased by a rule of joint and several liability that re-
quires payment of "extra" compensation- even if other states must later
contribute their share. When state responsibility exists but a state can
avoid conceding that it has acted in a morally blameworthy manner, a
state may be willing to agree either before or after an injury to accept
joint and several liability. The Space Objects Convention, which
Construction of Space Vehicle Launchers for the Conduct of the Phase I Firing of the Initial
Programme of the Organization, cited in C. JENKS, supra note 81, at 368-74.
178. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, § 44 (noting this fact but concluding, "We have to
act more or less arbitrarily because the alternative is not to act at all.").
179. See supra text accompanying notes 94-106.
180. See supra text accompanying note 138.
181. N. MATrE, supra note 83, at 159.
182. See supra text accompanying note 83.
183. "Wrongful conduct" simply refers to situations in which a state has breached a norm
and is responsible under international law. "Morally blameworthy" conduct may be viewed as
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recognizes joint and several liability both for concerted and independent
conduct of launching states, includes provisions for placing responsibility
without blame. The launching of a space object is generally viewed as a
proper and beneficial activity, and an obligation to pay can arise without
concession of blameworthiness.1 8 4
Finally, a principle of joint and several liability most likely will be em-
braced when the claim against the multiple states is directly akin to a
claim recognized under municipal law, such as a tort or breach of con-
tract claim. These claims may arise in two procedural contexts. First, an
individual victim, on its own account, may pursue states for wrongs par-
allel to municipal law violations.185 Second, states themselves may rely
on municipal analogy and seek reparation for injuries to their citizens on
a representative basis with the true objective of providing reparation for
the injured citizen.186 For example, in the course of the Samoan Claims
arbitral case,187 which found the United States and the United Kingdom
responsible for harm to German citizens in Samoa,188 the U.S. and Brit-
ish Commissioners referred to municipal law in formulating a decision
on the amount of damages owed and the types of injuries for which dam-
ages could be awarded. The Commissioners explained, "[N]or does there
seem to be any reason why as between nations liability for wrong-doing
should not be assessed in accordance with the rules observed in munici-
pal courts, and which are found to work substantial justice as between all
parties."189 Frequently, however, as Schwarzenberger states, "[T]he
damage suffered by a victim.., is merely one of the items included in the
184. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. A similar situation may exist, and joint
and several liability may be appropriate, with respect to states participating in joint ventures.
See Goldie, A General View of International Environmental Law: A Survey of Capabilities,
Trends and Limits, in HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, COLLOQUIUM 1973:
PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 25, 90 (C. Kiss ed. 1975);
Handl, supra note 170, at 535 n.47. Situations said to involve "international liability," in
which states engage in lawful conduct that causes transnational environmental harm, may
provide other examples in which states can avoid conceding blameworthy conduct. See supra
note 4.
185. See Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 553 (Ct. Cl. ), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 938 (1955); Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Org. for Indus., 23 LL.M.
1071, 1074-75 (1984).
186. See, e.g., Admin. Decision No. V, Mixed Claims Comm'n (U.S.-Germ.), 7 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards 119, 152 (1924).
187. Samoan Claims Arbitration (Germ. v. U.S. & U.K.), 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 15
(1902).
188. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
189. Joint Report No. II, Aug. 12, 1904, quoted in 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 55, at
1778. The Commissioners claimed that municipal law principles of compensation or damages
include principles applicable to the international sphere. As Brownlie states, however, "In the
sphere of international relations there are to be found important elements, including the rules
as to satisfaction, which would look strange in the law of tort and contract." I. BROWNLIE,
supra note 2, at 457 (footnote omitted).
265
Yale Journal of International Law
international claim for adequate reparation."'' 90 Where state claims for
compensation relate to to breaches of primary rules of state responsibility
that have no clear parallels in municipal law, such as claims for failure to
punish, tribunals may be less willing to apply and states may be less will-
ing to accept a principle developed from municipal analogy. Further-
more, if a state can obtain full reparation for its injuries through
measures of satisfaction, the principle of joint and several liability will
not affect the character of each breaching state's reparation obligation. 91
Given the realities of international legal process and the resistance of
states to rules that appear to infringe on their independence, joint and
several liability is likely to be accepted first in those limited situations in
which the offense to independence is minimal and indemnification ap-
pears most compelling. In particular, joint and several liability in inter-
national practice is likely to be most favorably received when the relative
degrees of fault of multiple responsible states appear approximately
equal, when contribution is available, when compensation is perceived to
be a particularly important concern in relation to the activity under con-
sideration, when states can avoid conceding wrongful or morally blame-
worthy conduct, and when claims appear analogous to claims under
municipal law.
VI. Conclusion
Any mature legal system governing the conduct of actors in a society
must contemplate multiple party responsibility for wrongs. The focus of
this article has been on the "simple" case of multiple state responsibility
in which the actions of a few states violate their international obligations
with regard to indivisible injury. Even in the simple case, the nature of
international legal process, including the difficulty of insuring contribu-
tion among wrongdoing states, explains why joint and several liability is
not currently widespread in international practice. The absence of an
international legislative authority also impedes the widespread adoption
of such a rule. A legislative authority could more easily make the diffi-
cult policy choices necessary to formulate a detailed comprehensive legal
regime in this area. For example, what should happen, in circumstances
of multiple state responsibility, if one jointly responsible state pays less
than the full amount of compensation? Should the liability of the re-
maining wrongdoing state or states be extinguished, be reduced by the
dollar amount of the settlement, or be reduced by an amount proportion-
190. 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 48, at 663.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
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ate to the settling state's degree of fault?192 It seems neither productive
nor possible at this stage, however, to predict all the complex "fine tun-
ings" that may be necessary in resolving certain aspects of the multiple
state responsibility problem.
Despite procedural and political reasons that may impede the accep-
tance or limit the scope of application of joint and several liability, many
considerations support its recognition as an international law rule gov-
erning the consequences of multiple state responsibility. The interna-
tional community's concern with deterring wrongful conduct by
channeling the cost of an injury to its author and with making an injured
party whole through pecuniary compensation for loss is well reflected in
international law rules of reparation. Municipal analogies, viewed either
as general principles of law or as tools in the progressive development of
international law, suggest that joint and several liability is the most ap-
propriate method to achieve these objectives. Finally, state practice,
although limited, evidences that joint and several liability has achieved a
measure of acceptance in international law, demonstrates that tribunals
deciding international cases have the requisite will and capacity to allo-
cate the burden of compensation among multiple responsible states, and
points toward favorable international reception of a principle of joint and
several liability.
192. Cf. Weir, supra note 100, §§ 97-103 (surveying the variety of municipal practice on
the issue).
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